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BAKER V. ARBOR DRUGS, INC.: PHARMACISTS
BEWARE OF VOLUNTARILY ASSUMING THE
DUTY TO PROTECT AGAINST HARMFUL
DRUG INTERACTIONS
Richard M. Eldridge* and Michael F. Smith**
I. INTRODUCTION
The following concoction is a recipe for spawning litigation. First, mix
in a liberal dose of media sensationalism. "Danger at the Drugstore."
Headlines such as this one from the August 26, 1996, issue of U.S. News &
World Report heighten public awareness of the potential hazards of pre-
scription drug interactions.
Second, stir in a healthy serving of competition. "According to the Na-
tional Association of Retail Druggists, 3,000 independent pharmacies
have gone out of business in the past two years-victims of competition
from big drug, grocery, and department-store chains."1 Prescription
drugs have become the "loss leaders" that are used to lure customers into
stores.
Third, mix with managed care. "HMOs have slashed reimbursement
rates to the point where pharmacies often get reimbursed at rates well
below what the drugs cost them."2
Finally, complete the mixture with pharmacies' mass media advertising
about computer programs that detect potential drug interaction. One
pharmacy's advertisement reads: "Every prescription filled for you is en-
tered in our Patient Profile System so we can check for drug interactions
and allergies .... [w]e will warn you of any unexpected side effects." 3
* Mr. Eldridge is a partner in the Tulsa, Oklahoma, law firm of Rhodes, Hierony-
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and pharmaceutical litigation.
** Mr. Smith is a senior associate who serves as Director of Legal Research and Writ-
ing in the Tulsa, Oklahoma, law firm of Rhodes, Hieronymus, Jones, Tucker & Gable. He
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Fueled by this mixture, litigants increasingly are asking courts to
reevaluate traditional holdings and extend the limits of legal liability of
pharmacies and pharmacists. Recent case law developments indicate that
the historical limits of legal liability may be altered significantly. In Baker
v. Arbor Drugs, Inc.,4 the Michigan Court of Appeals ruled that a phar-
macy could voluntarily assume a duty to prevent harmful drug interac-
tions to its customers. The case arose after the pharmacy implemented a
computerized drug interaction detection system. The Michigan Supreme
Court recently denied Arbor Drugs' appeal.5
This article briefly examines the history of the common law concept of
voluntary assumption of duty, and analyzes how Baker fits within the nat-
ural course of judicial evolution of that concept. After this article ana-
lyzes the Baker decision, it then examines the future implications of
Baker and demonstrates how the Baker analysis likely will lead to future
liability of pharmacies and pharmacists based on the concept of voluntary
assumption of duty. Finally, this article provides a logical method for re-
stricting Baker's application, consistent with public policy.
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE CONCEPT OF VOLUNTARY AssuMPTrION
OF DUTY
"A duty, in negligence cases, may be defined as an obligation, to which
the law will give recognition and effect, to conform to a particular stan-
dard of conduct toward another."6 The legal concept of a duty is the first
critical element in a common law negligence cause of action7 -without a
duty, a person cannot be held liable to another. 8 Courts impose a duty
upon persons within the context of various human relationships following
a balancing of socially relevant factors.' As society's ideas of human rela-
4. Baker v. Arbor Drugs, Inc., 544 N.W.2d 727 (Mich. Ct. App. 1996), appeal denied,
558 N.W.2d 725 (Mich. 1997).
5. Baker v. Arbor Drugs, 558 N.W.2d 725 (Mich. 1997).
6. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 53, at
356 (5th ed. 1984).
7. The elements of a negligence cause of action are generally as follows: "(1) duty; (2)
breach of that duty; (3) that the breach of that duty be the proximate cause of plaintiff's
injury; and (4) that plaintiff did in fact suffer injury." Schmanski v. Church of St. Casimir
of Wells, 67 N.W.2d 644, 646 (Minn. 1954).
8. See, e.g., South Carolina Elec. & Gas Co. v. Utilities Constr. Co., 135 S.E.2d 013,
617 (S.C. 1964) (noting that without the existence of a duty, no negligence cause of action
exists). Courts usually will determine first whether a duty exists, because, in the absence of
a duty, there is no need to conduct any further analysis with the remaining elements of a
negligence action. See, e.g., id.; Smith v. Day, 538 A.2d 157, 158 (Vt. 1987).
9. See, e.g., Davis v. Westwood Group, 652 N.E.2d 567, 569 (Mass. 1995) (noting that
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tionships and socially relevant factors evolve, the law defining the duties
within the context of human relationships evolves with them.' °
When determining the fictionalized concept of a duty under particular
circumstances, courts consciously or unconsciously balance the current
socially relevant factors." Based on earlier social conditions, very early
in the context of negligence law, a deep-rooted difference between "mis-
feasance" 2 and "nonfeasance' 3 arose that still controls in modem neg-
ligence cases.' 4 In the early common law, one who injured another by a
positive or affirmative act was held liable without regard to fault. 5 The
courts, however, were too occupied with misfeasance to be overly con-
cerned with nonfeasance. 6 "[Tihe law has persistently refused to impose
on a stranger the moral obligation of common humanity to go to the aid
of another human being who is in danger, even if the other is in danger of
losing his life.' 17
"[i]n determining whether the defendant had a duty to be careful, we look to existing social
values and customs, as well as to appropriate social policy").
10. William L. Prosser, Palsgraf Revisited, 52 MICH. L. REV. 1, 12-15 (1953).
11. A recent comprehensive statement of the current socially relevant factors in a typi-
cal negligence context dictates consideration of the following factors:
(1) foreseeability of harm to plaintiff; (2) degree of certainty that plaintiff suffered
injury; (3) closeness of connection between defendant's conduct and injury suf-
fered; (4) moral blame attached to defendant's conduct; (5) policy of preventing
future harm; (6) extent of burden to defendant and the consequences to the com-
munity of imposing a duty to exercise care with resulting liability for breach; and
(7) availability, cost, and prevalence of insurance for the risk involved.
Vu v. Singer Co., 538 F. Supp. 26, 29 (N.D. Cal. 1981) (citing Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ.
of Cal., 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976)).
12. "Misfeasance" is defined as "[t]he improper performance of some act which a per-
son may lawfully do." BLACK'S LAw DicrIONARY 1000 (6th ed. 1990).
13. "Nonfeasance" is defined as "[tihe omission of an act which a person ought to do."
Id.
14. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., supra note 6, § 56, at 373. Prosser and Keeton explain
the basis for the differentiation:
The reason for the distinction may be said to lie in the fact that by 'misfeasance'
the defendant has created a new risk of harm to the plaintiff, while by 'nonfea-
sance' he has at least made his situation no worse, and has merely failed to benefit
him by interfering in his affairs. The highly individualistic philosophy of the older
common law had no great difficulty in working out restraints upon the commis-
sion of affirmative acts of harm, but shrank from converting the courts into an
agency for forcing men to help one another.
Id.
15. See, e.g., Buch v. Amory Mfg. Co., 44 A. 809 (N.H. 1897).
16. See Osterlind v. Hill, 160 N.E. 301 (Mass. 1928) (holding that expert swimmer,
with a boat and rope at hand, who sees another drowning, is not liable for failing to rescue
drowning victim).
17. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., supra note 6, § 56, at 375.
1997]
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One area, however, where the law did not have difficulty imposing a
duty was in the context of voluntary assumption of duty.18 That area of
the law is summarized in Section 323 of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts:
One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to
render services to another which he should recognize as neces-
sary for the protection of the other's person or things, is subject
to liability to the other for physical harm resulting from his fail-
ure to exercise reasonable care to perform his undertaking, if (a)
his failure to exercise such care increases the risk of such harm,
or (b) the harm is suffered because of the other's reliance upon
the undertaking. 9
It is now well-settled in American jurisprudence that where one volunta-
rily assumes a duty to another, the failure to perform that duty reason-
ably will result in liability.20 Additionally, Section 323 of the
18. Id. at 373-82. See, e.g., Walker v. Smith, 1 Wash. C.C. 152, 4 Dall. 389, 29 Fed. Cas.
54 (CC. Pa. 1804) (finding agent breached duty where goods were sent to an agent to be
delivered upon receipt of payment, and he delivered goods without payment); see also
O'Leary v. Erie R.R., 62 N.E. 346 (N.Y. 1900) (holding defendant liable for plaintiff em-
ployee's injuries where defendant had adopted a practice of setting brakes on grain cars
going downgrade for the protection of plaintiff employee, but failed to do so on one
occasion).
19. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 323 (1964).
20. Tarpeh v. United States, 771 F. Supp. 427 (D. D.C. 1991); Collard v. United States,
691 F. Supp. 256 (D. Haw. 1988); Kipf v. United States, 501 F. Supp. 110 (D. Mont. 1980);
Pirocchi v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 365 F. Supp. 277 (E.D. Pa. 1973); Ramsey v. General
Accident Fire & Life Assurance Corp., 545 So. 2d 20 (Ala. 1989); Smith v. State, 921 P.2d
632 (Alaska 1996); Taylor v. Roosevelt Irrigation Dist., 232 P.2d 107 (Ariz. 1951); Flippo v.
State, 523 S.W.2d 390 (Ark. 1975); Perry v. D. J. & T. Sullivan, Inc., 26 P.2d 485 (Cal.
1933); Jefferson County Sch. Dist. R-1 v. Justus, 725 P.2d 767 (Colo. 1986); Chipman v.
Nat'l Say. Bank, 23 A.2d 922, 924 (Conn. 1942); Jardel Co. v. Hughes, 523 A.2d 518 (Del.
1987); Fidelity & Cas. Co. of New York v. L.F.E. Corp., 382 So. 2d 363 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1980); Huggins v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 264 S.E.2d 191 (Ga. 1980); Brooks v. Logan, 903
P.2d 73 (Idaho 1995); Nelson v. Union Wire Rope Corp., 199 N.E.2d 769 (Il. 1964); Robin-
son v. Kinnick, 548 N.E.2d 1167 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989); Cansler v. State, 675 P.2d 57 (Kan.
1984); Johnson v. Brey, 438 S.W.2d 535 (Ky. 1969); Harris v. Pizza Hut of Louisiana, Inc.,
455 So. 2d 1364 (La. 1984); Kemp v. Armstrong, 392 A.2d 1161 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1978);
Mullins v. Pine Manor College, 449 N.E.2d 331 (Mass. 1983); Sponkowski v. Ingham
County Rd. Comm'n., 393 N.W.2d 579 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986); State v. Phillip Morris, Inc.,
551 N.W.2d 490 (Minn. 1996); Higgins Lumber Co. v. Rosamond, 63 So. 2d 408 (Miss.
1953); Keenan v. Miriam Found., 784 S.W.2d 298 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990); A.G.A., Inc. v. First
Nat'l Bank, 474 N.W.2d 655 (Neb. 1991); Trull v. Town of Conway, 669 A.2d 807 (N.H.
1995); Barbarisi v. Caruso, 135 A.2d 539 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1957); Doe v. Hendricks, 690 P.2d
647 (N.M. Ct. App. 1979); Nallan v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 407 N.E.2d 451 (N.Y. 1980);
Jacobsen v. McMillan, 476 S.E.2d 368 (N.C. Ct. App. 1996); Sawicki v. Village of Ottawa
Hills, 525 N.E.2d 468 (Ohio 1988); Nye v. Cox, 440 P.2d 683 (Okla. 1968); Lyons v. Lich, 28
P.2d 872 (Or. 1934); Byerly v. Connor, 415 S.E.2d 796 (S.C. 1992); Erickson v. Lavielle, 368
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Restatement (Second) of Torts likely will guide those as yet silent juris-
dictions to accept the concept of voluntary assumption of duty. It is likely
that any court, when confronted with a factual scenario where a phar-
macy provides some type of harmful drug interaction detection system to
its customers, will hold that the pharmacy assumed a duty to prevent
harmful drug interactions. The pharmacy's failure reasonably to perform
that duty will result in liability for all injuries proximately caused by such
failure. The voluntary nature of Arbor Drugs' actions in Baker, of imple-
menting a computerized drug interaction detection system, gave rise to
Arbor Drugs' duty to its customers. Consequently, Arbor Drugs incurred
liability for injuries arising from its failure to reasonably perform that
duty with due care.
III. THE BAKER DECISION
A. Facts
Robert Baker was taking Parnate, 21 a prescription drug, for depression
after an attempted suicide in October of 1989.22 On February 26, 1992,
Robert developed a cold.23 He visited Dr. Henry Tomashevski at the
Park Medical Center.24 , During this visit, Robert informed Dr.
Tomashevski that he was taking Parnate.25 *Dr. Tomashevski prescribed
two medications, Ceftin26 and Tavist-D.27
Robert filled his prescription at the Arbor Drugs store in Wyandotte,
where he normally filled his prescription for Parnate.28 Penelope Ser-
afim, the pharmacist who filled Robert's prescription for Ceftin and
N.W.2d 624 (S.D. 1985); Trigg v. H.K. Ferguson Co., 209 S.W.2d 525 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1947);
Otis Eng'g Corp. v. Clark, 668 S.W.2d 307 (Tex. 1983); Poplaski v. Lamphere, 565 A.2d
1326 (Vt. 1989); Sheridan v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 100 P.2d 1024 (Wash. 1940); Green
Spring Farms v. Kersten, 401 N.W.2d 816 (Wis. 1987); and Chavez v. City of Laramie, 389
P.2d 23 (Wyo. 1964).
21. Baker v. Arbor Drugs, Inc., 544 N.W.2d 727, 729 (Mich. Ct. App. 1996). Parnate is
grouped in a class of drugs known as monoamine oxidase inhibitors and can cause severe
complications if taken with certain foods or other medications. Id. Robert Baker was
aware of the dangers of adverse reactions with Parnate and strictly followed instructions
given by his physician, Dr. Arthur Hewitt, and the drug's manufacturer. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. Dr. Tomashevski noted in Robert's medical records that Robert was taking
Parnate. Id.
•26. Id. Ceftin is an antibiotic. Id.
27. Id. Tavist-D is a decongestant. Id.
28. Id. Robert had his Parnate prescription filled 11 days earlier at that Arbor Drugs
store in Wyandotte. Id.
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Tavist-D, indicated that she was not aware Robert was taking Parnate
when she filled his prescriptions.29
At the time Robert had his Ceftin and Tavist-D prescriptions filled,
Arbor Drugs had a system in operation known as "Arbortech Plus," a
drug interaction detection computer system.3" A drug interaction was de-
tected between Tavist-D and Parnate on the Arbortech Plus, but the
pharmacist did not see the interaction indicated on the computer, proba-
bly because a technician overrode the interaction notification.3 The
pharmacist was certain that the computer detected the interaction be-
cause the letter "I" appeared next to the price on the prescription label.32
Serafim also testified that she was aware that Parnate and Tavist-D
should not be taken at the same time.33
After having his prescriptions filled, Robert took the prescribed doses
at home.34 Later that evening, Robert complained to his wife, Robin,
that he was not feeling well.35 Robin took him to the hospital where he
was diagnosed as having suffered a stroke. 36 The stroke was the direct
result of ingesting Parnate and Tavist-D at the same time.37
On June 22, 1992, Robert and Robin filed suit against Arbor Drugs,
Inc., Dr. Tomashevski, and Park Medical Center.38 The claims against
Dr. Tomashevski and Park Medical Center were settled out of court.39
On July 16, 1992, Robert committed suicide.4" In his suicide note, Robert
claimed that, among other things, the stroke was too much for him to
handle.4 Robin, as personal representative of Robert's estate, pursued
the lawsuit against Arbor Drugs, alleging negligence and other causes of
action.42
Arbor Drugs sought summary judgment on the negligence allegations,
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34, Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. Robin also alleged causes of action for violation of Michigan's Consumer Pro-
tection Act and fraud.
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arguing that it did not owe a duty to Robert.43 The trial court agreed,
ruling that there was no duty on the part of the pharmacy, and that liabil-
ity rested with the prescribing doctor.44 The decedent's wife appealed.
B. Disposition on Appeal
The issue on appeal was whether a pharmacy voluntarily owed a duty
to its customers to prevent prescription drug interactions through the im-
plementation of its drug interaction detection system.45 Robin argued
that Arbor Drugs had voluntarily assumed such a duty to Robert by im-
plementing, advertising, and using its Arbortech Plus drug interaction de-
tection system designed specifically for that purpose.46 The Michigan
Court of Appeals ruled that Arbor Drugs voluntarily assumed a duty of
care to Robert when it implemented the Arbortech Plus system, and then
advertised that the system would detect and prevent harmful drug inter-
actions for its customers.47
C. Analysis
In finding that the pharmacy had assumed a duty to Robert by imple-
menting a computerized drug interaction detection system for its custom-
ers, the Michigan Court of Appeals was careful to narrow the application
of its holding to the facts specifically presented. This holding does not
signal a new development in the law binding all pharmacies and pharma-
cists to a duty. to detect possible drug interactions in filling all prescrip-
tions.48 Rather, the holding was limited to the situation where a
pharmacist or pharmacy voluntarily assumes a duty, but fails to perform
that duty with ordinary care. Because Arbor Drugs advertised its
Arbortech Plus computer system as a means of detecting harmful drug
interactions, it had assumed the duty to its customers to detect and warn
against potential harmful drug interactions.
1. Pharmacies Are Not Liable for Correctly Filling Prescriptions
The Michigan Court of Appeals began its analysis by stating the gen-
eral rule that pharmacies are not liable for correctly filling a prescrip-
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 731.
48. Id.
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tion.4' Although pharmacies are held to a very high standard of care in
filling prescriptions, when pharmacies supply the drug prescribed by a
doctor, there is generally no liability attached for injuries arising as a re-
sult of the patient's consumption of that drug.5"
2. Pharmacies Do Not Owe a Duty to Warn of Possible Side Effects
of Prescription Drugs
The Michigan court also noted that pharmacies generally owe no duty
to consumers to warn of possible side effects of prescription drugs.51 The
court relied on earlier case law, concluding that a pharmacy does not owe
a duty to consumers to warn of possible side effects of a prescribed drug
where the prescription is proper on its face and neither the physician nor
the manufacturer has required the pharmacy to give any warning to the
consumer.5" The court was mindful to note that the authority relied upon
for this general proposition expressly reserved consideration of the issue
of whether a pharmacy could be liable where the pharmacy knows of a
particular patient's unique problems 53 or where a pharmacy fills two in-
compatible prescriptions at the same time."4
49. Id. at 730. Compare infra note 70 and cases cited therein.
50. Baker, 544 N.W.2d at 730. This conclusion is supported by the public policy of not
requiring pharmacists to provide an oversight function to physicians by questioning every
physician's prescription. See, e.g., McKee v. American Home Prod. Corp., 782 P.2d 1045
(Wash. 1989). A different conclusion is warranted when an error is on the face of the
prescription. See, e.g., Gassen v. East Jefferson Gen. Hosp., 628 So. 2d 256 (La. Ct. App.
1993) (holding "a pharmacist has a limited duty to inquire or verify from the prescribing
physician clear errors or mistakes in the prescription"); Peoples Serv. Drug Stores v. Som-
erville, 158 A. 12 (Md. 1932) (holding a pharmacist "cannot escape liability in com-
pounding and dispensing poisons in deadly and unusual doses even though the physician's
prescription called for such dosage"); and Kampe v. Howard Starke Prof. Pharmacy, 841
S.W.2d 223 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992) (concluding that pharmacist had a duty to inquire or verify
the appropriateness of a prescription when it is irregular on its face).
51. Baker, 544 N.W.2d at 730.
52. Id. (citing Stebbins v. Concord Wrigley Drugs, Inc., 416 N.W.2d 381 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1987)). In Adkins v. Mong, 425 N.W.2d 151 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988), the Michigan
Court of Appeals also held that a pharmacy had no duty to warn a consumer of the poten-
tial side effects of the substances it was dispensing, provided the prescriptions submitted
were all valid on their face. A pharmacy owes no duty to monitor and intervene in a
customer's reliance on drugs prescribed by a licensed treating physician. Id. See also infra
note 69 and cases cited therein.
53. Hand v. Krakowski, 453 N.Y.S.2d 121 (1982) (holding that a pharmacist did have a
duty to warn where the pharmacist had personal knowledge that the customer was an alco-
holic and that the prescribed drug was contraindicated).
54. Baker, 544 N.W.2d at 730 (citing Stebbins v. Concord Wrigley Drugs, Inc., 416
N.W.2d 381, 388 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987)).
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3. Pharmacies Do Not Owe a Duty to Monitor a Customer's
Drug Usage
The Michigan Court of Appeals also held that a pharmacy owes no
duty to monitor a customer's drug usage, or to discover the customer's
addicted status.55 Furthermore, absent knowledge of a customer's ad-
dicted status, a pharmacy owes no duty to refuse to sell an addictive, non-
prescription drug to that customer.56
4. Where a Pharmacy Voluntarily Assumes a Duty, and Performs
Such Duty Negligently, the Pharmacy is Liable for Injuries
Arising Therefrom
After discussing situations where a pharmacy generally owes no duty to
its customers, the Michigan Court of Appeals confronted Robin Baker's
contention that Arbor Drugs voluntarily assumed a duty to the decedent
because it implemented and used the Arbortech Plus drug interaction de-
tection computer system.57 The court further observed that the law im-
poses duties upon defendants who voluntarily assume obligations that
they were under no legal obligation to assume.58
In evaluating whether Arbor Drugs voluntarily assumed the duty to its
customers to detect and prevent harmful drug interactions, the court ex-
amined some of Arbor Drugs's commercials, advertising the Arbortech
Plus system.59 The court specifically noted three examples of Arbor
Drugs's advertisements for Arbortech Plus:
This prescription drug called Coumadin is an anticoagulant.
And this is Micronase, a drug prescribed for diabetes. Both are
quite effective. But it could be very dangerous if you were tak-
ing both at the same time. How can you avoid harmful drug
interactions? Simple. Get your prescription filled at Arbor
Drugs where Arbortech Plus provides your Arbor pharmacist
with your complete medication history, so we're aware of any
possible medication interactions. Arbortech Plus. You can't get
any better.
55. Id. (citing Kintigh v. Abbott Pharmacy, 503 N.W.2d 657 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993)).
56. Id. (citing Kintigh, 503 N.W.2d at 658).
57. Id. at 731.
58. Id. (citing Sponkowski v. Ingham Co. Rd. Comm., 393 N.W.2d 579, 581 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1986); Rhodes v. United Jewish Charities of Detroit, 459 N.W.2d 44, 46 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1990); Terrell v. LBJ Electronics, 470 N.W.2d 98, 99-100 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991); Hol-
land v. Liedel, 494 N.W.2d 772, 775 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992); Babula v. Robertson, 536
N.W.2d 834, 837 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995)). See also supra note 20 and cases cited therein.
59. Baker, 544 N.W.2d at 731 nl.
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This prescription drug called Dilantin is an anticonvulsant. And
this is Tagamet, used for treating ulcers. Both are very effective,
but there could be complications if you were taking both at the
same time. How can you avoid unwanted drug interactions?
Simple. Get your prescription filled at Arbor Drugs where
Arbortech Plus provides your Arbor pharmacist with your com-
plete medication history, so we're aware of any possible medica-
tion interactions. Arbortech Plus. You can't get any better.
Do you know what happens when you bring your prescription to
Arbor Drugs? First, it's checked for insurance coverage and
screened for possible drug interactions and therapeutic duplica-
tion. That's done very quickly by the Arbortech Plus computer.
Then your prescription is filled and labelled. That's done very
carefully, by your Arbor pharmacist. The bottom line? Your
prescription is not just filled quickly, it's filled safely. Only at
the Arbor Pharmacies. You can't get any better.
60
Based on this evidence, the court concluded that Arbor Drugs obviously
designed and marketed its Arbortech Plus system to detect harmful drug
interactions. 6 The court concluded that Arbor Drugs voluntarily as-
sumed a duty of care to its customers, like Roger Baker, when it imple-
mented the Arbortech Plus system and then advertised that system as a
means of detecting and warning against harmful drug interactions.62
IV. FUTURE IMPLICATIONS OF BAKER
The Baker decision may have far-reaching implications in the future
with respect to those pharmacies that assume similar duties to their cus-
tomers. This is particularly true in the situation where a pharmacy adver-
tises some form of drug interaction detection system. Under such
circumstances, the pharmacy may face liability for all injuries proximately
arising from the failure to reasonably perform such assumed duty.
Pharmacies should be aware of the current market trend in advertising
and providing drug interaction detection systems. If such obligation is
advertised, it must be carried out cautiously and competently. In Baker,
one of the technicians apparently overrode the Arbortech Plus interac-
tion system so that the pharmacist was able to fill a prescription that
caused a drug interaction in the customer, resulting in a stroke. This illus-
trates the danger pharmacists encounter as "financial pressures ... cause
60. Id.
61. Id. at 731.
62. Id.
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them to work 12 hours a day with hardly a break to build higher volume
and make up for lower prices. Meantime, pharmacists are supervising
lesser trained technicians."63
Also a significant question remains about the efficacy of the computer-
ized databases being used. One investigative report questioned "whether
their databases are outdated, inaccurate or simply unheeded., 64 Even
when the computer provides accurate information to the pharmacist, it is
still subject to human interpretation. Computer programs typically dis-
play differing levels of severity of drug interaction and provide instruc-
tions that may vary from patient to patient.65
V. ALTERNATIVE TREATMENT
Some courts have held that pharmacies and pharmacists have a duty to
act with due care and diligence in compounding and selling prescription
drugs and to refrain from negligently doing or failing to do an act which
would injure a customer.66 For example, in Riff v. Morgan Pharmacy,67
the Pennsylvania Superior Court held that a pharmacist is a medical pro-
fessional who, during the performance of professional duties, is held to a
standard of care, skill, and intelligence that is uniform throughout the
profession.68 Additionally, most courts accept that a pharmacist does not
owe a duty to monitor, advise, or counsel a customer regarding a medica-
tion that the customer's physician has prescribed, absent some irregular-
ity on the face of the prescription.69 Pharmacists will, of course, be liable
63. Headden et al., supra note 1, at 49.
64. Id. at 51.
65. Id.
66. See, e.g., Lasley v. Shrake's Country Club Pharmacy, Inc., 880 P.2d 1129 (Ariz.
1994); Krueger v. Knutson, 111 N.W.2d 526 (Minn. 1961); French Drug Co. v. Jones, 367
So. 2d 431 (Miss. 1978); Spry v. Kiser, 102 S.E. 708 (N.C. 1920); Ferguson v. Williams, 399
S.E.2d 389 (N.C. Ct. App. 1991); Batiste v. American Home Prod. Corp., 231 S.E.2d 269
(N.C. Ct. App. 1977); Dooley v. Everett, 805 S.W.2d 380 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1990); and Burke
v. Bean, 363 S.W.2d 366 (Tex. Civ. App. 1962).
67. Riff v. Morgan Pharmacy, 508 A.2d 1247 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986).
68. Id. at 1251.
69. See, e.g., Pysz v. Harry's Drug Store, 457 So. 2d 561 (Fla. Ct. App. 1984); Walker v.
Jack Eckerd Corp., 434 S.E.2d 63 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993); Kinney v. Hutchinson, 449 So. 2d
696 (La. Ct. App. 1984); Adkins v. Mong, 425 N.W.2d 151 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988); Kampe v.
Howard Stark Prof'l Pharmacy, Inc., 841 S.W.2d 223 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992); Batiste v. Amer-
ican Home Prod. Corp., 231 S.E.2d 269 (N.C. Ct. App. 1977); Johnson v. Primm, 396 P.2d
426 (N.M. 1964); Singer v. Oker, 87 N.Y.S.2d 686 (1949); Makripodis v. Merrell-Dow
Pharm., Inc., 523 A.2d 374 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987); Riff v. Morgan Pharmacy, 508 A.2d 1247
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1986); and McKee v. American Home Prod. Corp., 782 P.2d 1045 (Wash.
1989).
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for improperly filling a prescription.7" Furthermore, a pharmacist can be
liable for refilling a prescription without proper authorization from the
customer's physician.71
At least two courts, other than the Baker court, have found that phar-
macists or pharmacies may be held liable for failure to perform a volunta-
rily assumed duty with due care.72 In Ferguson v. Williams,73 the North
Carolina Court of Appeals reversed a trial court's dismissal of a cause of
action against a pharmacy and pharmacist finding that they had assumed
a duty to the decedent.74 There, the plaintiff's husband had a prescription
filled for Indocin.75 Prior to filling the prescription, the plaintiff's hus-
band allegedly informed the pharmacist that he was allergic to aspirin,
Percodan, and penicillin.76 The pharmacist allegedly advised plaintiff's
husband that it was safe to take Indocin, even though the medical litera-
ture specified that the use of the drug Indocin is contraindicated in per-
sons who suffer aspirin allergies or aspirin sensitivities.77 Plaintiff's
husband consumed the Indocin, allegedly based on the pharmacist's as-
surances that it was okay to do so, and suffered an anaphylactic reaction
resulting in his death.78
Based on these allegations, the North Carolina appellate court con-
cluded that the pharmacy and pharmacist had assumed a duty to plain-
tiff's decedent. The court noted "[w]hile a pharmacist has only a duty to
act with due, ordinary care and diligence, this duty, like all others, ex-
pands and contracts with the circumstances."79 The pharmacist had vol-
untarily given advice, in addition to dispensing medication.80 Based on
70. See Lou v. Smith, 685 S.W.2d 809 (Ark. 1985); Wingfield v. Peoples Drug Store,
Inc., 379 A.2d 685 (D.C. Ct. App. 1977); Sparks v. Kroger Co., 407 S.E.2d 105 (Ga. Ct.
App. 1991); Jacobs Pharmacy Co. v. Gibson, 159 S.E.2d 171 (Ga. Ct. App. 1967); Stebbins
v. Concord Wrigley Drugs, Inc., 416 N.W.2d 381 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987); Troppi v. Scarf,
187 N.W.2d 511 (Mich. Ct. App. 1971); and Parker v. Yen, 823 S.W.2d 359 (Tex. Ct. App.
1991).
71. See, e.g., Stafford v. Nipp, 502 So. 2d 702 (Ala. 1987); and Clair v. Paris Road
Drugs, Inc., 573 So. 2d 1219 (La. Ct. App. 1991).
72. Ferguson v. Williams, 374 S.E.2d 438 (N.C. Ct. App. 1988); see infra notes 73-81
and accompanying text; Frye v. Medicare-Glasser Corp., 605 N.E.2d 557 (Ill. 1992); see
infra notes 82-92 and accompanying text.
73. Ferguson, 374 S.E.2d at 438.
74. Id. at 440.
75. Id. at 438.
76. Id. at 439.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 440.
80. Id.
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these circumstances, the court concluded that "once a pharmacist is
alerted to the specific facts and he or she undertakes to advise a cus-
tomer, the pharmacist then has a duty to advise correctly." 81
In Frye v. Medicare-Glasser Corp.,2 the Illinois Supreme Court
adopted a restricted approach to voluntarily assumed duty. The court
concluded that a pharmacy and a pharmacist could be liable, under cer-
tain circumstances, for their failure to perform, with due care, an assumed
duty.83 There, plaintiff's decedent died after simultaneously consuming
alcohol and the prescription drug Fiorinal. The plaintiff alleged that the'
pharmacy and pharmacist assumed a duty to warn the customer of the
possible side effects of alcohol when combined with Fiorinal by attaching
a label to the prescription bottle with a picture of a drowsy eye and the
words "May Cause Drowsiness."84 The evidence demonstrated that
when the pharmacist utilized the pharmacy's computer program, which
suggests warning labels that might be provided about side effects of pre-
scription drugs, she learned that Fiorinal can cause drowsiness, may in-
tensify the effects of alcohol, and may impair one's ability to drive.
85
The court rejected plaintiff's argument that the pharmacist, by warning
that Fiorinal may cause drowsiness, assumed the duty to warn of all possi-
ble side effects, including those associated with alcohol consumption.86
The court noted that although a pharmacist can assume a duty to warn of
possible side effects of prescription drugs, that duty is limited to the ex-
tent of the pharmacist's voluntary undertaking.87 Thus, the pharmacy
and pharmacist were not liable under the circumstances presented to the
court because they assumed only the duty to warn of the potential drow-
siness side effect of. Fiorinal.88 The pharmacist satisfied this duty, the
court ruled, by placing an appropriate warning label on the prescription
bottle.89
The court supported its conclusion with public policy arguments. Ob-
serving that a contrary holding would discourage pharmacists from plac-
ing any warning labels on prescription containers, the court concluded
81. Id.
82. Frye v. Medicare-Glasser Corp., 605 N.E.2d 557 (Ill. 1992).
83. Id. at 560.
84. Id. at 558.
85. Id. at 559. The pharmacist testified that she did not utilize the alcohol warning
label because that label had offended so many customers in the past. Id.
86. Id. at 560.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
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that imposing a broader duty could deprive the consuming public, as a
whole, of any warnings which might be beneficial.9" The court further
noted that a contrary holding would present practical difficulty.91 For ex-
ample, additional warnings for Fiorinal, if a broader duty were imposed,
would necessarily include all indications for the drug: "hypersensitivity to
aspirin, caffeine or barbiturates; patients with porphyria; drug ,depen-
dence; the effects of use with other central nervous system depressants;
adverse effects during pregnancy; excess dosage; dizziness and light-
headedness; and gastrointestinal disturbances such as nausea, vomiting
and flatulence." 92 Requiring a pharmacist to provide warning labels for
each of these indications of Fiorinal, just as with any other drug with nu-
merous indications, would be unworkable.
The courts in Baker, Ferguson, and Frye will likely not be the last to
find potential liability on the part of a pharmacy or pharmacist for failure
to perform with due care a duty voluntarily assumed. However, as Frye
suggests, courts must carefully weigh competing public policy considera-
tions in defining the limits of such liability.
VI. UNANSWERED CONCERNS FOLLOWING BAKER
Left unanswered by Baker is the situation where a pharmacy simulta-
neously fills two potentially dangerously interactive prescriptions written
by the same physician. Is the pharmacist required to warn the customer
of the risk of interaction in such a circumstance? Could such a warning
countermand a physician's intentionally prescribed treatment? Should a
pharmacist be permitted to assume that a physician is aware of the poten-
tial risks of interaction and has made a medical judgment that such risks
are justified?
Also left unanswered by Baker is the situation where the customer
purchases over-the-counter drugs at the same time a prescription is being
filled. If the pharmacist knows of a possible drug interaction between the
prescription drug and the over-the-counter drug, can the pharmacist be
held liable for failing to warn the customer that consumption of both
drugs simultaneously will result in a harmful interaction?
The questions raised are multitudinous. Should pharmacies be re-
quired to be linked to ascertain interactions between drugs dispensed by
different outlets of the same chain of stores? And what liability should
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
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mail-order house pharmacies, which never have any face-to-face contact
with the patients, incur?
Complicating the issue of warnings is the laissez faire attitude of most
patients. A Columbus, Ohio, pharmacist told U.S. News & World Report
that: "Even my wife throws (the written alerts) away."93 If a proliferation
of warnings results from the imposition of new legal duties on pharma-
cists, will patients truly be served? Or will they be numbed by the ava-
lanche of unnecessary "cover yourself" warnings that such rulings would
stimulate?
VII. CONCLUSION
Courts must carefully assess whether it is sound public policy to subject
pharmacies and pharmacists to liability based on a broad interpretation
of the concept of voluntary assumption of duty. There is great potential
to work a disservice to the public. It is beneficial to have an extra check
on the prescription drug filling process. Attempting to prevent harmful
drug interactions should be the goal of all entities in the prescription drug
distribution chain. An unrestricted application of the Baker holding,
however, encourages pharmacies to sit back and do nothing to prevent
harmful drug interactions, rather than risk tort liability under similar cir-
cumstances. Such an outcome does not serve the public. The constraint
illustrated by the Frye approach is necessary to recognize the peculiarities
of the patient/pharmacist relationship.
93. Headden et al., supra note 1, at 49.
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LEARNING DISABLED STUDENT ATHLETES: A
SPORTING CHANCE UNDER THE ADA?
Katie M. Burroughs*
[Learning disabled students] are wired differently. If you are a
teacher and are explaining a concept to a [learning disabled] stu-
dent, you are communicating a message but the [learning dis-
abled] student is wired in such a manner that he [or she] doesn't
receive the same message you sent.'
Learning deficiencies have been recognized as a disability for a little
over three and one-half decades.2 Moreover, learning disabilities are be-
ing diagnosed at a rate of 200,000 students per year.3
In the last decade, several learning disabled high school and college
athletes have challenged the refusals by their schools to allow them to
participate in competitive athletics based on their age or because estab-
lished academic eligibility requirements were not met.4 These students
have sought relief under one of two statutes: the Rehabilitation Act of
1973 ("Rehabilitation Act"), which prohibits discrimination against the
disabled by agencies receiving federal financial assistance, or the Ameri-
cans With Disabilities Act ("ADA"), which prohibits discrimination
against the disabled in activities conducted by both public and private
* Ms. Burroughs serves as law clerk to the Honorable Fred J. Cartolano, Court of
Common Pleas for Hamilton County, Cincinnati, Ohio. She graduated cum laude from the
Columbus School of Law, Catholic University of America, in 1997.
1. Taylor Bell, New NCAA Guidelines Hurt Learning-Disabled Athletes, CHI. SUN-
TIMES, Sept. 29, 1995, at 112.
2. J. Cohen, Learning Disabilities and the College Student. Identification and Diagno-
sis, 11 ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY 177 (1983).
3. THOMAS G. FINLAN, LEARNING DISABILITY, THE IMAGINARY DISEASE 3 (1994).
4. See generally Pottgen v. Missouri State High Sch. Activities Ass'n, 857 F. Supp. 654
(E.D. Mo. 1994), rev'd, 40 F.3d 926 (8th Cir. 1994); Hoot v. Milan Area Sch., 853 F. Supp.
243 (E.D. Mich. 1994); Sandison v. Michigan High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 863 F. Supp. 483
(E.D. Mich. 1994), rev'd in part, 64 F.3d 1026 (6th Cir. 1995); Johnson v. Florida High Sch.
Activities Ass'n, 899 F. Supp. 579 (M.D. Fla. 1995), vacated, 102 F.3d 1172 (11th Cir. 1997),
appeal after remand, 103 F.3d 720 (1997).
5. 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-796 (1988 & Supp. 11989, Supp. II 1990, Supp. III 1991, Supp. IV
1992, Supp. V 1993)(section 504 provides the remedial context for action by an athlete).
Poole v. South Plainfield Bd. of Educ., 490 F. Supp. 948, 949 (D.N.J. 1980) (referred to 29
U.S.C. § 794 (1988) as "section 504" of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973).
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entities.6 Understanding the application of the ADA and the Rehabilita-
tion Act to learning disabled student athletes is the first step toward as-
sessing the viability of such lawsuits.
The issue of the eligibility of learning disabled students to participate in
interscholastic and intercollegiate athletics arises in two distinct situa-
tions. First, students diagnosed as learning disabled often repeat one or
more grades in elementary school. As a result, these students may begin
their senior year of high school at age nineteen, as opposed to the aver-
age age of eighteen. Such a student is ineligible to compete in interschio-
lastic activities because most school systems deny participation to high
school students who turn nineteen before the start of the school year.7
Second, special education courses offered at the high school level to ac-
commodate learning disabled students, pursuant to federal legislation, 8
often do not meet the National College Athletic Association ("NCAA")
requirements for participation.9 Furthermore, these students may not
qualify for athletic scholarships because special education courses are
taught at a slower pace than mainstream classes. Such courses do not
meet core eligibility requirements established by organizations such as
the NCAA.' ° Therefore, the NCAA may bar students enrolled in such
courses from participating in NCAA-sanctioned, college-level athletic
competitions.
This Article will focus on the application of the ADA to learning dis-
abled student athletes denied participation in interscholastic or intercolle-
giate athletics.'1 The question of whether a qualified student athlete with
6. Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994 &
Supp. 11 1990, Supp. III 1991, Supp. IV 1992, Supp. V 1993).
7. See, e.g., Pottgen, 857 F. Supp. 654.
8. Individuals With Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1491 (1994); The
Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-796 (1973); 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213.
9. See Ganden v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, No. 96-C6953, 1996 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 17368, at *22 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 21, 1996); see also Gary Reinmuth, Taking on the
NCAA Gymnast Also Caught By Academic Rules, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 28, 1996, at C22 (stating
that Michelle Huston was ineligible to compete because of grades received before disabil-
ity diagnosed and failure to meet core course requirements), Shelly Anderson, Edinboro
Freshman Frustrated By NCAA Rules on Learning Disabled, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE,
Nov. 17, 1996, at D-12 (stating that Shawn Farester does not meet NCAA core course
requirement because he took a freshman English class for learning disabled students).
10. Tanya Bricking, Bright Futures Clouded; Special-Needs Stars Just Seek a Second
Look, USA TODAY, Dec. 20, 1995, at 1C.
11. Congress intended that prior interpretations of the Rehabilitation Act serve as
interpretive guidance of the ADA, making a legal analysis under the ADA similar to an
analysis of section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disa-
bility in State and Local Government Services, 56 Fed. Reg. 35,696 (1991).
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a learning disability has a statutory right under Title 1112 or Title 11113 of
the ADA to participate on an interscholastic high school or intercollegi-
ate athletic team will be explored. This Article argues that qualified stu-
dent athletes with learning disabilities are covered by the ADA and do
have a right to participate in athletics.
Part I of this Article examines the different learning disabilities that
affect student athletes. Part II of this Article discusses the background
and provisions of the ADA. Part III reviews the two lines of cases con-
cerning eligibility, and Part IV analyzes the opposing viewpoints and as-
sesses the weaknesses of the theory that these students do not qualify for
protection under the ADA. Part V argues that the ADA applies to a high
school athlete's challenge of the NCAA's qualifying criteria. Part VI pro-
vides a practitioner's guide to building a viable disability discrimination
claim under the ADA, challenging the denial of participation in organ-
ized athletics for a student athlete. Finally, this Article discusses the pub-
lic policy argument that the public interest in regulating interscholastic
activities must yield to the public interest in prohibiting discrimination
against those with disabilities. This Article concludes that, while Con-
gress has provided a strong foundation in the area of disability law
through the ADA, the Department of Justice 14 needs to provide more
direction by interpreting key statutory terminology to aid the courts in
ensuring evenhanded treatment of the disabled.
I. UNDERSTANDING LEARNING DISABILITIES
A learning disability is a disorder that affects a person's ability either to
decipher visual images and auditory sounds or to connect information
from different parts of the brain."5 The limiting effects of a learning disa-
bility begin to emerge through a child's specific difficulties with spoken
and written language, coordination, self-control, or attention. 16 Learning
disabilities encompass a wide range of developmental, cognitive, and be-
havioral problems, usually manifested in school-age children. 7 A learn-
ing disability is often a lifelong condition that can affect a person's school
12. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-12165.
13. Id. at §§ 12181-12189.
14. Under the ADA, Congress granted the Department of Justice, through the Attor-
ney General, the power to promulgate regulations implementing the ADA. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 12134(a)(Title II), § 12186(b)(Title III).
15. SHARYN NEUWIRTH, NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH (1993).
16. Id.
17. ELIZABETH DANE, PAINFUL PASSAGES 27 (1990).
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or work, daily routines, family life, friendship, and even play.'
8
In 1967, the National Advisory Committee on Handicapped Children
suggested a definition for "specific learning disability." 9 This definition
was later included in federal regulations 20 promulgated pursuant to the
Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975:21
[T]hose children who have a disorder in one or more of the ba-
sic psychological processes involved in understanding or in using
language, spoken or written, which disorder may manifest itself
in imperfect ability to listen, think, speak, read, write, spell, or
do mathematical calculations. Such disorders include such con-
ditions as perceptual disabilities, brain injury, minimal brain
dysfunction, dyslexia, and developmental aphasia. Such term
does not include children who have learning problems which are
primarily the result of visual, hearing, or motor disabilities, of
mental retardation, of emotional disturbance, or of environmen-
tal, cultural, or economic disadvantage. 2
This legal definition of "specific learning disabilities" remains in effect,
despite a Fall 1987 report submitted to Congress by the United States
Interagency Committee on Learning Disabilities,23 proposing a new uni-
form definition concerning learning disabilities.2 4
The causes of learning disabilities are not known.25 Recent research
shows that most learning disabilities do not stem from a single, specific
area of the brain, but from difficulties in bringing together information
18. Id.
19. Joseph F. Smith, Jr. & M. Kay Runyan, How Private Secondary Schools Can Meet
Their Obligations to Accommodate Students with Special Learning Disabilities, 17 W. NEw
ENG. L. REV. 77, 78 (1995).
20. MARTHA HART-JOHNS & BRUCE JOHNS, GIVE YOUR CHILD A CHANCE 90 (1982).
21. Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, Pub. L. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773
(1975).
22. This definition was adopted by the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20
U.S.C. § 1401(a)(15) (1994 & Supp. V 1993), and its implementing regulations, 34 C.F.R.
§ 300.7(b)(10)(1996).
23. Department of Health and Human Services, Public Health Services, Public Health
Reports, March 1988 "Uniform Definition Proposed for Learning Disabled" (summarizing
learning disabilities programs, proceedings of a National Conference on Learning Disabili-
ties, and presentations at a public hearing held in the fall of 1986 and calls for related
action).
24. In an effort to classify and clearly define learning disabilities, the proposed defini-
tion defined the term "learning disabled" as a "heterogeneous group of disorders 'pre-
sumed to be due to central nervous system dysfunction' and 'manifested by significant
difficulties in the acquisition and use of listening, speaking, reading, writing, reasoning, or
mathematical abilities, or of social skills."' Id.
25. Id. at 10.
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from various brain regions a.2 6  Some scientists believe that the distur-
bances in brain structure and function begin before birth.27
According to federal regulations, "learning disability" is a broad term
with vague parameters, 8 encompassing a variety of causes, symptoms,
treatments, and outcomes.29 Despite this lack of clarity, three established
categories of learning disabilities exist: (1) developmental speech and lan-
guage disorders; (2) academic skills disorders; and, (3) "other," a catch-all
category including certain coordination disorders and learning handicaps
not covered by the other terms.30 Each of these categories includes a
number of specific learning disorders.31
Developmental speech and language disorders reflect a difficulty in
producing speech sounds, using spoken language to communicate, or un-
derstanding what other people say.32 The specific diagnosis may include
a developmental articulation disorder,33 developmental expressive lan-
guage disorder,34 or developmental receptive language disorder. 35 Aca-
demic skills disorders result in a child being years behind his or her peers
in developing reading, writing, and arithmetic skills.36 Here, the possible
26. Id. Throughout pregnancy, the fetal brain develops into a compl ex organ made of
billions of specialized cells called neurons. This brain development is vulnerable to disrup-
tions and things can affect how the neurons form or interconnect. If the disruption occurs
early, the fetus may die. If the disruption occurs later, when the cells are becoming special-
ized, it may leave errors in the cell makeup, location, or connections, which some scientists
at the National Institute of Health believe may later show up as learning disabilities. Id. at
10-11.
27. Id. The leading theory on this subject posits that learning disabilities stem from
subtle disturbances in brain structure and function caused by genetic factors; tobacco, alco-
hol, and other drug use; problems during pregnancy and delivery; and toxins in the child's
environment. Id.
28. DANE, supra note 17, at 4. This Article assumes the legal definition of "learning
disabled" is the proper meaning of this term.
29. NEUWIRTH, supra note 15, at 3. Because some developmental delays can be attrib-
uted to the natural rate of maturation, specific criteria must be met for someone to be
diagnosed as learning disabled. Characteristics and criteria for diagnosing a learning disa-
bility appear in a reference book called Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disor-
ders ("DSM"). AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC Ass'N, DSM-IV (4th ed. 1994).
30. Id. at 5.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. "Children with this disorder may have trouble controlling their rate of
speech." Id.
34. NEUWIRTH, supra note 15, at 6. "Some children with language impairments can
have difficulty expressing themselves in speech." Id.
35. Id. Children with this disorder may have trouble understanding certain aspects of
speech as if "their brains are set to a different frequency and the reception is poor." Id.
36. Id.
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diagnoses include developmental reading disorder (or dyslexia),37 devel-
opmental writing disorder,38 or developmental arithmetic disorder.39
"Other" learning disabilities include categories such as motor skills disor-
ders and various developmental disorders that do not meet the criteria
for a specific learning disability.4" This category includes coordination
disorders that can lead to poor penmanship, as well as certain spelling
and memory disorders.41
Learning disabilities also affect a child's or adult's emotional and social
development. 4' Although all children experience successes and failures
in academic and social situations,43 learning disabled children are more
sensitive and aware of their differences from others.44 Children with
learning disabilities assimilate what is said about them and "may define
themselves in light of their disabilities, as 'behind,' 'slow,' or 'differ-
ent.' ,45 To overcome these feelings of anxiety and low self-esteem result-
ing from negative feedback, the learning disabled child must be presented
with structured experiences that provide a positive reality of success and
accomplishment. 46 Some researchers have suggested that learning dis-
abled children benefit from participation in sports and extracurricular ac-
tivities because it helps them to cope with threats to their self-esteem and
anticipated loss of control that stems from the learning disability.47 Ac-
cording to these researchers, organized athletics can provide a structured
environment in which the child can succeed. 48 Moreover, the compre-
hensive physical education and recreational programming provided by
team sports enhances the child's development and provides important
37. Id. at 7. A person with a reading disorder may have trouble focusing on printed
material, recognizing sounds, understanding words or grammar, building ideas, or even
storing ideas in the memory. Id.
38. Id. at 6. A person with a developmental writing disorder may have problems inter-
connecting the brain functions dealing with vocabulary, grammar, hand movement, and
memory. Id.
39. Id. at 8. A person with developmental arithmetic disorder may have problems
recognizing numbers and symbols, memorizing facts, and understanding abstract concepts
such as value and fractions. Id.
40. Id. at 8-9.
41. Id. at 9.
42. DANE, supra note 17, at 89.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 92.
45. NEUWIRTH, supra note 15, at 24.
46. DANE, supra note 17, at 102.
47. Id.
48. ERNEST SIEGEL & RUTH GOLD, EDUCATING THE LEARNING DISABLED 272 (1982)
("Feelings of productiveness and satisfaction are linked to the use of leisure time.").
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skills, such as teamwork, which can be used and developed throughout
life.49 Furthermore, research has found that a significant relationship ex-
ists between physical well-being and receptiveness to classroom
learning.5°
II. THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES Acr
President George Bush signed the ADA5 into law on July 26, 1990.52
The ADA provided for "a clear and comprehensive national mandate for
the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities."53
Forty-three million Americans have one or more physical or mental
disabilities.54
The purpose of the ADA is to prohibit discrimination against the dis-
abled in a wide range of activities conducted by both public and private
entities." To accomplish the goals outlined by Congress, the ADA grants
comprehensive rights to disabled individuals in several areas including
employment,56 public accommodations,57 state and local government
services,58 and telecommunications.59
A. What Is Covered Under the ADA?
The Rehabilitation Act prohibits discrimination against the disabled by
governmental agencies receiving federal financial assistance.' The ADA
49. Id. at 278.
50. Id. at 271.
51. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213.
52. Id.
53. Id. at § 12101(b)(1).
54. Id. at § 12101(a)(1).
55. Ronald D. Wenkart, The Americans With Disabilities Act and Its Impact on Public
Education, 82 EDUC. L. REP. 291, 292 (1993). Congress outlined the purpose of the Act as
follows:
(1) to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of
discrimination against individuals with disabilities; (2) to provide consistent, en-
forceable standards addressing discrimination; (3) to ensure that the federal gov-
ernment plays a central role in enforcing the standards established in the Act;
and, (4) to invoke the sweep of Congressional authority in order to address the
major areas of discrimination faced by the disabled.
42 U.S.C. §§ 12101(b)(1)-(b)(4).
56. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-12117.
57. Id. at §§ 12181-12189.
58. Id. at §§ 12131-12134.
59. Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability in State and Local Government Serv-
ices, 56 Fed. Reg. 35,694 (1991).
60. Wenkart, supra note 55, at 291.
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prohibits discrimination in the previously unregulated private sector.61
The ADA further prohibits discrimination against the disabled in all ele-
ments of society, including private schools, universities, restaurants,
transportation services, telecommunications services, private employers,
and landlords. 6
2
1. Title II: Public Entities
According to Title II of the ADA: "no qualified individual with a disa-
bility shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in
or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a pub-
lic entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity. '' 63 Title I
of the ADA defines a "public entity" as "any State or local govern-
ment,' ' 61 or "any department, agency, special purpose district, or other
instrumentality of a state or states or local government., 65 In contrast to
the Rehabilitation Act that covers only those state and local government
programs receiving federal financial assistance,66 the ADA covers pro-
grams, activities, and services of state and local government, regardless of
whether the particular activity or program is federally funded.6 7 Courts
have construed programs, like state athletic associations, as instrumental-
ities of the state, thus, a public entity under the ADA, because public
schools delegate extensive authority to these athletic associations.68
2. Title III: Public Accommodation Operated by Private Entities
Title III of the ADA provides that "no individual shall be discriminated
against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of goods,
services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any
61. Id.
62. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213.
63. Id. at § 12132.
64. Id. at § 12131(1)(A).
65. Id. at § 12131(1)(B).
66. 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-796 (Supp. V 1993).
67. John J. Coleman, III & Marcel L. Debruge, A Practitioner's Introduction to ADA
Title 11, 45 ALA. L. REV. 55, 57 (1993).
68. See Dennin v. Connecticut Interscholastic Athletic Conference, Inc., 913 F. Supp.
663, 670 (D. Conn. 1996), vacated, 94 F.3d 96 (2d Cir. 1996); Johnson v. Florida High Sch.
Activities Ass'n, 899 F. Supp. 579, 583 (M.D. Fla. 1995), vacated, 102 F.3d 1172 (11th Cir.
1997), appeal after remand, 103 F.3d 720 (1997); Hoot v. Milan Area Sch., 853 F. Supp. 243,
251 (E.D. Mich. 1994); Sandison v. Michigan High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 863 F. Supp. 483,
487 (E.D. Mich. 1994), rev'd in part, 64 F.3d 1026 (6th Cir. 1995); Pottgen v. Missouri State
High Sch. Activities Ass'n, 857 F. Supp. 654, 662 (E.D. Mo. 1994), rev'd, 40 F.3d 926 (8th
Cir. 1994).
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place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases
to), or operates a place of public accommodation."69 The Department of
Justice regulations implementing Title III of the ADA define "place of
public accommodation" as a facility operated by a private entity whose
operations affect commerce and come within at least one of twelve enu-
merated categories."7
Both Title III of the ADA and 'the implementing regulations cover
public accommodations operated by private entities.71 Thus, Title III of
the ADA protects the disabled from unequal enjoyment of "places of
public accommodation" operated by a private entity. Public accommoda-
tions include private universities, colleges, and other places of educa-
tion.7" One court has concluded that the NCAA falls within the ambit of
Title III of the ADA because it is a private entity operating in a place of
public accommodation.73
3. Application of the ADA to High Schools, Universities, and State
and National Athletic Organizations
To establish coverage under Title II of the ADA, an individual must
show (1) the organization accused of discrimination is a "public entity;"
(2) he is a "qualified individual with a disability;" and, (3) he has been
excluded from participation or denied the benefits of the public entity's
activities."
To establish a prima facie case under Title III, a student athlete must
show (1) he is disabled; (2) the organization is a "private entity" that
69. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a).
70. 28 C.F.R. § 35.104 (1993). The numerous categories listed include public places,
such as a place of recreation or exercise, gymnasium, secondary school, and undergraduate
school. Id.
71. 42 U.S.C. § 12181(6) (defining a private entity as any entity other than a public
entity, which is defined in section 12131(1), of this Title). The United States Supreme
Court found the National Collegiate Athletic Association ("NCAA") to be a private en-
tity. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179 (1988).
72. 42 U.S.C. § 12181.
73. Ganden v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, No. 96-C6953, 1996 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 17368, at *34 (N.D. I11. Nov. 21,1996). The court in Ganden found that the NCAA
has a close connection with the public accommodations of its member institutions. Fur-
thermore, the court thought it was probable that the NCAA operates these athletic facili-
ties by controlling the competitions at such facilities. Id. (relying on Welsh v. Boy Scouts of
Am., 93 F.2d 1267, 1270 (7th Cir. 1993) which found that a member organization could be a
"place of public accommodation" if there is a close connection between the organization's
purpose and the facility).
74. Pottgen v. Missouri State High Sch. Activities Ass'n, 857 F. Supp. 654, 658 (E.D.
Mo. 1994), rev'd, 40 F.3d 926 (8th Cir. 1994).
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operates a "place of public accommodation;" and, (3) he was denied the
opportunity to "participate in or benefit from services or accommoda-
tions on the basis of his disability," and that reasonable accommodations
could be made which do not fundamentally alter the nature of the
organization.
The recurring issue concerning learning disabled students under the
ADA is whether the "otherwise qualified" element, as supplemented by
the "reasonable accommodation" requirement, is met. These elements
are part of both Title II and Title III claims under the ADA.7 6
B. Defining Disability
Congress intended Title II of the ADA to be interpreted consistently
with prior interpretations of section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. 7
Much of the ADA's language is identical to that of the Rehabilitation Act
because Congress intended to extend the application of the Rehabilita-
tion Act to entities that do not receive federal financial assistance.7 In
fact, the legislative history of the ADA explicitly directs courts to use case
law decided under the Rehabilitation Act for interpretative guidance.79
Thus, a legal analysis of cases brought under the ADA parallels an analy-
sis under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, and is helpful in discern-
ing the intent of the underlying language of the ADA.8°
1. The Rehabilitation Act of 1973
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act provides in pertinent part:
No otherwise qualified individual with handicaps in the United
States, as defined in section 706(8) of this title, shall, solely by
reason of her or his handicap, be excluded from the participa-
tion in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimina-
75. Johnson v. Florida High Sch. Activities Ass'n, 899 F. Supp. 579, 583 (M.D. Fla.
1995), vacated, 102 F.3d 1172 (11th Cir. 1997), appeal after remand, 103 F.3d 720 (1997).
76. See id. (Title III); Pottgen, 857 F. Supp. at 662-63 (Title II).
77. Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability in State and Local Government Serv-
ices, 56 Fed. Reg. 35,696 (1991). See also Robert W. Edwards, The Rights of Students With
Learning Disabilities and the Responsibilities of Institutions of Higher Education Under the
Americans with Disabilities Act, 2 J.L. POL'Y 213, 224 (1994).
78. Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability in State and Local Government Serv-
ices, 56 Fed. Reg. 35,696 (1991).
79. S. J.D. Comm. Rep. No. 116, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. at 44-45 (1989); H.R. Labor
Comm. Rep. No. 485, 101st Cong., 2nd Sess., pt. 2, at 51 (1990).
80. Id.
Learning Disabled Student Athletes
tion under any program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance.8'
Regulations promulgated under the Rehabilitation Act by the Depart-
ment of Education82 and the Department of Health and Human Serv-
ices" prohibit colleges and high schools from discriminating against
qualified handicapped athletes.84 The regulations provide that qualified
handicapped athletes must be given "an equal opportunity for participa-
tion" in interscholastic and intercollegiate activities.85 To prevail under
the Rehabilitation Act, a learning disabled athlete must show that (1) he
is handicapped within the meaning of the Rehabilitation Act;86 (2) he is
"otherwise qualified" for the services sought; (3) he was excluded from
the services sought "solely by reason of his handicap;" and, (4) the pro-
gram in question receives federal financial assistance.87
2. Disability Under the ADA
A "disability" under the ADA, as well as under the Rehabilitation Act,
is "(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or
more of the major life activities of such individual; (B) a record of such
impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an impairment."88 The
Report of the Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources notes
that this language is comparable to the regulatory definitions promul-
gated pursuant to section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.89 While many
disabilities are included within the ADA's definition of "disability," this
Article focuses on the first definition of disability-physical or mental
impairment-which includes learning disabilities within its parameters.9 °
Under the implementing regulations of the ADA, "physical or mental
impairment" means "(B) any psychological disorder or condition ....
81. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (1994).
82. 34 C.F.R. § 104.37(c), § 104.47(a) (1992); see also Mitten, infra note 84, at 1008.
83. 45 C.F.R. § 84.37(c), § 84.47(a)(1992); see also Mitten, infra note 84, at 1008.
84. Matthew J. Mitten, Amateur Athletes with Handicaps or Physical Abnormalities:
Who Makes the Participation Decision?, 71 NEB. L. REV. 987, 1008 (1992).
85. Id.
86. Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-569,
§ 102(p)(32)(A),(B), 106 Stat. 4344 (1992) (demonstrating that in 1992, the term "disabil-
ity" was substituted for "handicap").
87. Johnson v. Florida High Sch. Activities Ass'n, 899 F. Supp. 579, 582 (M.D. Fla.
1995), vacated, 102 F.3d 1172 (11th Cir. 1997), appeal after remand, 103 F.3d 720 (1997).
88. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101,12101(2) (1994 & Supp. 111990, Supp. III 1991, Supp. IV 1992,
Supp. V 1993).
89. See S. REP. No. 101-116, at 21 (1989); 45 ALA. L. REv. 55, 59 (1993).
90. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2).
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such as ... specific learning disabilities."91 A physical or mental impair-
ment,92 though, is not a protected disability under the ADA unless the
disability substantially limits a major life activity.93 "Substantially limits"
generally means unable to perform a major life activity that the average
person in the general population can perform, or significantly restricted
as to condition, manner, or duration of such performance compared to a
member of the general population.94 Major life activities include, among
other things, "learning."95 Thus, an individual diagnosed with a specific
learning disability is "disabled" within the meaning of the ADA because
a diagnosed learning disability limits one's ability to learn.
3. Qualified Individual With a Disability
The ADA, unlike the Rehabilitation Act,96 defines "qualified individ-
ual with a disability" as:
[A]n individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable
modifications to rules, policies, or practices, the removal of ar-
chitectural, communication or transportation barriers, or the
provisions of auxiliary aids and services, meets the essential eli-
gibility requirements for the receipt of services or the participa-
tion in programs or activities provided by a public entity.97
The definition embodies the interpretations reached by courts in their
struggle to define "otherwise qualified individual" under the Rehabilita-
tion Act.98 Thus, courts interpreting the term "qualified individual with a
disability" under the ADA use an analysis similar to the analysis adopted
by courts under the Rehabilitation Act. 99
Interpreting the Rehabilitation Act, the United States Supreme Court,
in its first case dealing with the application of the term "qualified individ-
91. 28 C.F.R. § 35.104 (1993); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h) (1993).
92. 28 C.F.R. § 35.104.
93. S. RaP. No. 101-116, at 22; see Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability in
State and Local Government Services, 56 Fed. Reg. 35,694, 35,699 (1991).
94. Coleman & Debruge, supra note 67, at 59.
95. 28 C.F.R. § 35.104.
96. Under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, an "otherwise qualified" individual is "one
who is able to meet all of a program's requirements in spite of his handicap." Rehabilita-
tion Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1988). See also Southeastern Community College v.
Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 406 (1979).
97. 42 U.S.C. § 12131(2).
98. Edwards, supra note 77, at 224.
99. See, e.g., Pottgen v. Missouri State High Sch. Activities Ass'n, 857 F. Supp. 654
(E.D. Mo. 1994), rev'd, 40 F.3d 926 (8th Cir. 1994); Johnson v. Florida High Sch. Activities
Ass'n, 899 F. Supp. 579, 582 (M.D. Fla. 1995), vacated, 102 F.3d 1172 (11th Cir. 1997),
appeal after remand, 103 F.3d 720 (1997).
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ual," held in Southeastern Community College v. Davis,100 that an institu-
tion is not required to lower or modify standards to accommodate a
disabled person.10' The Court concluded that an "otherwise qualified
person" is "one who is able to meet all of the program's requirements in
spite of his [disability].' 1 2
The Court further explained its holding in Davis in Alexander v.
Choate:1
0 3
Davis ... struck a balance between the statutory rights of the
handicapped to be integrated into society and the legitimate in-
terests of federal grantees in preserving the integrity of their
programs: while a grantee need not be required to make 'funda-
mental' or 'substantial' modifications to accommodate the hand-
icapped, it may be required to make 'reasonable' ones.'0 4
Thus, Alexander required institutions to show that a reasonable accom-
modation was not available that would permit a disabled individual to
participate.10 5 The Court found that an accommodation was not reason-
able if it imposed "undue financial and administrative burdens,"' 0 6 or
"fundamentally alter[ed] the nature of the service, program or activ-
ity. '  Therefore, by combining the holdings in Davis and Alexander, a
"qualified individual" became one who could participate in a program or
activity if the institution could implement a "reasonable modification. '1 0 8
To determine if a disabled individual under the ADA is "a qualified
individual," courts must first determine what the necessary eligibility re-
quirements are for the activity in which the individual wants to partici-
pate. 10 9 Next, the court must make a factual determination as to whether
100. Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. at 397. Davis could not under-
stand speech except through lip reading. A community college rejected her application to
the nursing program because it believed Davis' hearing disability would not allow her to
safely participate in the program and to safely care for patients. Id. at 407.
101. Id. at 405.
102. Id. at 407 (finding that legitimate physical qualifications, such as the ability to un-
derstand speech without reliance on lip reading, may be essential to participation in clinical
program for patient safety).
103. Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287 (1985).
104. Id. at 300.
105. Edwards, supra note 77, at 227. But see Davis, 442 U.S. at 412. Under Davis, the
university was not required to determine if a reasonable accommodation would allow the
hearing impaired student to participate, but only to show a rational basis for denying ad-
mission. Id.
106. Davis, 442 U.S. at 412.
107. 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7)(1993).
108. Edwards, supra note 77, at 227.
109. Id.
1997]
70 Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy [Vol. 14:57
the individual meets these requirements. 110 If the individual does not
meet the necessary requirements, the court must next determine whether
a "reasonable accommodation" exists that would allow the individual to
successfully participate in the activity."'
III. JUDICIAL VIEWS ON ATHLETIC PARTICIPATION BY, THE LEARNING
DISABLED STUDENT UNDER THE ADA
The central issue in lawsuits brought by learning disabled student ath-
letes seeking to compete in competitive sports is whether the student ath-
lete is a qualified individual with a disability who has been discriminated
against by reason of such disability." 2 One line of cases holds that stu-
dent athletes with learning disabilities are not qualified individuals under
the ADA because no "reasonable accommodations" are available. The
other line of cases holds that student athletes are qualified under the
ADA, and thus are able to participate in high school athletics.
A. Sandison v. Michigan High School Athletic Association
The leading case holding that learning disabled athletes are not to be
excluded solely by reason of their disability, and that waiving eligibility
requirements is not a reasonable modification under the ADA, is
Sandison v. Michigan High School Athletic Association."3  Ronald
Sandison and Craig Stanley sought a preliminary injunction 1 4 against the
Michigan High School Athletic Association ("MHSAA"). 1 5 The pur-
pose of the injunction was to prevent the MHSAA from prohibiting
Sandison and Stanley from running on the cross-country and track teams
and to preclude the MHSAA from penalizing the high schools for permit-
ting the two students to participate. 16 The United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Michigan granted the injunction, allowing the
plaintiffs to compete on the teams despite their ineligibility based on the
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Mitten, supra note 84, at 1010-11.
113. Sandison v. Michigan High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 64 F.3d 1026 (6th Cir. 1995), rev'g
in part, 863 F. Supp. 483 (E.D. Mich. 1994).
114. Id. The court considered four factors in determining whether the district court
abused its discretion in issuing the preliminary injunction: "(1) 'strong' likelihood of suc-
cess on the merits; (2) if student would otherwise suffer irreparable injury; (3) if injunction
would cause substantial harm to others; and, (4) whether public interest would be served."
Id. at 1030.
115. Id. at 1028.
116. Id. at 1029.
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MHSAA's nineteen-year age limitation." 7 The United States Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, however, dismissed as moot the MHSAA's
challenge to the preliminary injunction, and reversed the portion of the
injunction that ordered the MHSAA to refrain from penalizing the high
schools." 8
Both Sandison and Stanley were high school athletes who were held
back early in their educational training because of learning disabilities."19
Sandison began first grade two years late. 120 Four years later, at age
eleven, doctors diagnosed Sandison with an auditory input disability.
12
With special education support, Sandison did not experience any further
delay in his education. He participated on the high school cross-country
and track teams during the first three years of high school. In May of
1994, three months before he was to begin his senior year, Sandison
turned nineteen.' 22
Craig Stanley was diagnosed early in his educational career with a
learning disability in mathematics.'2 3 Due to his learning disability, Stan-
ley repeated kindergarten and spent five years in a special education
classroom. Stanley then entered a regular classroom in the fourth, rather
than the fifth, grade. Like Sandison, Stanley also competed on the cross-
country and track teams during his first three years of high school. Prior
to beginning his senior year, Stanley turned nineteen.124
The MHSAA oversees interscholastic athletic events.'2 5 Most high
schools in Michigan are members of the organization and adopt MH-
SAA's rules governing interscholastic sports. 2 6 MHSAA regulations
prohibit student athletes over nineteen years of age, without exception,
117. Sandison v. Michigan High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 863 F. Supp. 483, 484-85 (E.D.
Mich. 1994), rev'd in part, 64 F.3d 1026 (6th Cir. 1995).
118. Sandison v. Michigan High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 64 F.3d 1026, 1028 (6th Cir. 1995),
rev'g in part, 863 F. Supp. 483 (E.D. Mich. 1994).
119. Id. Sandison had a processing speech and language disorder which caused him to
delay beginning first grade for two years. Stanley had a learning disability in mathematics.
120. Sandison, 863 F. Supp. at 484-85.
121. Id. An auditory input disability hinders one's ability to distinguish between
sounds. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Sandison, 64 F.3d at 1028.
125. MHSAA HANDBOOK 1996-97 12 (1996). During the Sandison case, the 1995-96
edition of the handbook was in effect. However, all applicable provisions were not
amended in the 1996-97 edition. Those provisions that were modified are noted in shaded
gray in the text of the handbook.
126. Id. at 13.
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from participating in interscholastic sports. 27
Sandison and Stanley argued that their exclusion from interscholastic
sports constituted unlawful discrimination because of their learning disa-
bilities, and violated both the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA. 128 The
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit ruled in favor of the
MHSAA.129 Reversing the second portion of the preliminary injunction,
which barred the MHSAA from penalizing the high schools because an
ineligible player competed on a high school team, the court determined
that the plaintiffs were unlikely to succeed on the merits of their Rehabil-
itation Act and ADA claims.
According to the court of appeals, the primary issues were whether the
student athletes with learning disabilities were excluded by reason of
their disability, and whether a waiver of the age requirement was a rea-
sonable modification. 3 ' The court examined plaintiffs' claims under the
Rehabilitation Act and the ADA, reaching the same result under both
statutes.131 First, the court held that the plaintiffs were not excluded from
participation in high school interscholastic athletics "solely by reason of"
their learning disability. 3 2 Rather, the court found that absent their re-
spective learning disability, Sandison and Stanley failed to satisfy the
MHSAA age requirement. 33 Thus, the court concluded that the boys
did not meet the age requirement because of their birth dates, not be-
cause of their learning disability.' 34
Next, the court held that the student athletes were not "otherwise qual-
ified" to participate in interscholastic cross-country and track competi-
tions. 135 Initially, the court found that the age limitation imposed by the
127. Id. (stating "[a] student who competes in any interscholastic athletic contest must
be under nineteen (19) years of age, except that a student whose nineteenth (19th) birth-
day occurs on or after September 1 of a current school year is eligible for the balance of
that school year.").
128. Sandison, 64 F.3d at 1028.
129. Id. at 1036.
130. Id. at 1031, 1034.
131. Id. at 1030, 1036-37.
132. Id. at 1036; see also Cavallaro v. Ambuck, 575 F. Supp. 171 (W.D.N.Y. 1983) (con-
cluding under the Rehabilitation Act that student was not "otherwise qualified" because
19-year age limitation had no relation to his disability).
133. Sandison, 64 F.3d at 1036.
134. Id. See also Reaves v. Mills, 904 F. Supp. 120 (W.D.N.Y. 1995) (finding New York
state regulation prohibiting participation in high school athletics if a student turned 19
before September first was based on age, and therefore applied uniformly to mildly men-
tally retarded high school student who had repeated the first grade).
135. Sandison, 64 F.3d at 1034.
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MHSAA was a "necessary requirement of the program."' 36 Adopting
the conclusion of the district court, the court of appeals found that the
age restriction prevents injury to other players and eliminates unfair com-
petitive advantages that older and larger participants might provide;
therefore, it was essential in maintaining the amateur character of the
athletic program. 13
7
Relying on the record compiled by the trial court below, the court
found that "older students are generally more physically mature than
younger students."' 38 The court, however, found that the district court
erred, finding that a waiver constituted a reasonable accommodation.
139
First, the court stated that expanding the permissible age range for partic-
ipation would fundamentally alter the nature of the interscholastic ath-
letic program. 140 The court asserted that by disregarding the age
restriction, more physically mature students would be permitted to par-
ticipate in athletics, thereby changing the nature of high school athletics.
.Second, the court found that making a competitive fairness determina-
tion of each athlete requesting a waiver would place an "undue burden"
on MHSAA.' 4' MHSAA asserted that there are five factors to weigh in
deciding if an athlete had an unfair competitive advantage: chronological
age, physical maturity, athletic experience, athletic skill level, and mental
ability to process sports strategy.'14 MHSAA would have to require high
school coaches and physicians hired by MHSAA to make eligibility de-
terminations. The court found that balancing these factors in relation to
opposing teams, team members, and the team unit was nearly impossible;
thus, it was unreasonable to call upon coaches and physicians for this
purpose.'
43
Finally, the Sixth Circuit found that while participating in athletics
helped the students progress through school, 4 4 the waiver of the age re-
striction would not help these students overcome their learning disabili-
136. Id. at 1037. Certain eligibility requirements are essential by nature. Pottgen v.
Missouri State High Sch. Activities Ass'n, 40 F.3d 926, 930-31 (8th Cir. 1994), rev'g, 857 F.
Supp. 654 (E.D. Mo. 1994).
137. Sandison, 64 F.3d at 1035.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. See id. at 1027 (expert testimony of MHSAA).
143. Id.
144. Id. at 1035.
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ties. 145 A waiver "merely remove[d] the age ceiling as an obstacle," but
did not alter the fact that the students have a learning disability.1 46 Thus,
the court concluded that a waiver of the age restriction was not a "reason-
able accommodation., 147
In making its determination in Sandison, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit adopted the two-step analysis of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in Pottgen v. Missouri State
High School Activities Association.148 The Sixth Circuit first determined
that the age requirement was essential for safety reasons. Then, it con-
ducted an individualized inquiry to see if Stanley or Sandison satisfied the
age requirement with or without reasonable accommodation. According
to the court, a waiver of the age requirement for learning disabled ath-
letes could not be reasonable. 149 Therefore, the student athletes could
not be considered "otherwise qualified" and were not covered by the Re-
habilitation Act or the ADA.
B. Johnson v. Florida High School Activities Association
In Johnson v. Florida High School Activities Association, the United
States District Court for the Middle District of Florida held that a waiver
of the less than nineteen years of age eligibility requirement to partici-
pate in high school athletics was a reasonable modification under the
ADA. 5° Dennis Johnson, a high school senior diagnosed with a learning
disability, sought an injunction against the Florida High School Athletic
Association ("FHSAA").' 5 ' The FHSAA found Johnson ineligible to
participate on both the high school football and wrestling teams because
he was nineteen years of age. 52 Relying on the decision of the district
court in Sandison, the Johnson court granted an injunction, enjoining the
145. Id. (stating an accommodation operates to overcome the disability so that it no
longer prevents the individual from participating).
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Pottgen v. Missouri State High School Activities Association, 40 F.3d at 930-31
(applying a two-step analysis to determine, first, whether the eligibility requirements were
essential and, then, whether Pottgen met those requirements with or without reasonable
modification).
149. Sandison, 64 F.3d at 1035.
150. Johnson v. Florida High Sch. Activities Ass'n, 899 F. Supp. 579, 580 (M.D. Fla.
1995), vacated, 102 F.3d 1172 (11th Cir. 1997), appeal after remand, 103 F.3d 720 (1997).
This Article analyzes the reasoning behind the district court decision as a model for courts
finding disabled student athletes eligible for participation under the ADA.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 581, 582.
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FHSAA from enforcing its rules prohibiting Johnson from playing inter-
scholastic athletics and penalizing the high school for allowing Johnson to
play.153
Because of a hearing impediment, Johnson began kindergarten a year
late.' 54 He was held back a second time in first grade because of his inad-
equate reading and language skills.'5 5 Johnson played football and wres-
tled for the first three years of high school.' 5 6 However, he turned
nineteen two months before he was to begin his senior year. 57 Accord-
ing to the FHSAA, Johnson could not participate in interscholastic sports
because he turned nineteen before the school year started.'58 The FH-
SAA denied Johnson's request for a "hardship" exception because the
FHSAA committee lacked the authority under its bylaws to "waive the
age eligibility rule."' 59 Under FHSAA rules, the age eligibility require-
ment cannot be waived because it is considered an essential eligibility
requirement by FHSAA. 6°
After first determining that the FHSAA was a public entity,' 6' the dis-
trict court determined that Johnson was a "qualified individual with a
disability" under both the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA. 162 Next, the
district court assessed whether the age requirement was an essential eligi-
bility requirement. According to the court, the purposes of the FHSAA's
age requirement were (1) to promote safety; and (2) to create an even,
fair playing field, preventing schools from "red shirting"'163 their players
153. Id. at 587.
154. Id. at 581.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 582.
157. Id.
158. FLORIDA HIGH SCH. ACTIVITIES Ass'N, OFFICIAL HANDBOOK OF THE FHSAA,
§ 19.4.1, at 31 (1995) [hereinafter Handbook of the FHSAA].
159. Id. at § 20.1.1, at 40 (giving Executive Committee authority to set aside the effect
of any eligibility requirement except the age limit, when, in its opinion, the rule works a
hardship upon the individual student).
160. Id.
161. The court found that the FHSAA is an "instrumentality of the state" because it
acts as a regulatory arm of Florida high schools in controlling all aspects of interscholastic
activities in both private and public high schools. Johnson v. Florida High Sch. Activities
Ass'n, 899 F. Supp. 579, 583 (M.D. Fla. 1995), vacated, 102 F.3d 1172 (11th Cir. 1997),
appeal after remand, 103 F.3d 720 (1997). Because the court determined that the FHSAA
is a public entity, it conducted an analysis under Title II of the ADA. See supra notes 66-72
and accompanying text.
162. Johnson, 899 F. Supp. at 583, 586 (finding that this is the only issue in contention
besides coverage under the ADA).
163. Douglas S. Looney, This Year You're Going to See Red, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED,
Sept. 1, 1982, at 20. "Red shirting" is the practice of holding a player out of competition
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to build a better program. 164 Adopting the reasoning of the district
court's remand decision in Sandison'65 and the dissent in Pottgen,66 the
Johnson court found that "the relationship between the age requirement
and its purposes must be such that waiving the age requirement in the
instant case would necessarily undermine the purposes of the require-
ment.' 167 The court rejected the argument that because the FHSAA
deems the age requirement essential, it is in fact essential. Relying on the
dissent in Pottgen, the court stated that "'if a rule can be modified without
doing violence to its essential purposes ... it 'cannot' be essential to the
nature of the program or activity."'168
Because he was not the largest football team member playing his posi-
tion, he did not present any danger to other players. The court noted that
Johnson was a mid-level football player, and no more experienced than
other players because he only played organized sports for three years.
169
Furthermore, the court found that weight divisions in wrestling elimi-
nated any safety concerns. 170 Thus, the court concluded that Johnson's
participation on the field did not undermine the purposes of safety and
fairness of the FHSAA regulations. 17  However, the court stressed that
its holding was individualized and limited to the facts of Johnson's
case. 172 Therefore, the court held the essential purposes of the age re-
quirement were not undermined by allowing Johnson to participate on
the team. 73
for a season without that player losing a year of eligibility. It was first adopted by the
NCAA in 1961 to allow an athlete to play his full four seasons even if he missed a year
because of injury. Id.
164. Id.
165. Sandison v. Michigan High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 863 F. Supp. 483, 491 (E.D. Mich.
1994), rev'd in part, 64 F.3d 1026 (6th Cir. 1995).
166. Pottgen v. Missouri State High Sch. Activities Ass'n, 40 F.3d 926, 931 (8th Cir.
1994), rev'g, 857 F. Supp. 654 (E.D. Mo. 1994).
167. Johnson v. Florida High Sch. Activities Ass'n, 899 F. Supp. 579, 583 (M.D. Fla.
1995), vacated, 102 F.3d 1172 (11th Cir. 1997), appeal after remand, 103 F.3d 720 (1997).
168. Id. at 585 (quoting Pottgen v. Missouri State High Sch. Activities Ass'n, 40 F.3d
926, 932-33 n.7 (8th Cir. 1994)).
169. See id.
170. See id.
171. Johnson, 899 F. Supp. at 585. See also University Interscholastic League v.
Buchanan, 848 S.W.2d 298 (Tex. Civ. App. 1993) (holding fundamental nature of program
not altered where one learning disabled student below average weight and another learn-
ing disabled student average in size permitted to participate with waiver of age
requirement).
172. See Johnson, 899 F. Supp. at 585.
173. Id.
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IV. PROBLEMS WITH THE OPPOSING VIEWS
The Johnson case, and other district court decisions 74 granting similar
injunctions, present an individualized analysis of each learning disabled
student's circumstances in accordance with the ADA and its implement-
ing regulations. The opposing analysis set forth in Sandison, however,
lacks legislative and judicial support. Courts recognizing a cause of ac-
tion by learning disabled student athletes under the ADA offer three dif-
ferent reasons to support the proposition that student athletes with
learning disabilities are protected under the ADA. First, learning dis-
abled student athletes who are prohibited from participation in athletics
are being excluded "by reason of such disability."' 75 Second, the essen-
tial eligibility requirements established by such organizations should be
reviewed on an individualized, case-by-case basis by the courts to deter-
mine if the student athlete is otherwise qualified.' 76 Third, reasonable
accommodations, which do not alter the nature of the program or pose an
undue burden, must be provided by the organization.' 77 If the organiza-
tion asserts reasonable accommodations are not possible, substantial jus-
tification must be shown.'78 Each of these rationales will be examined in
turn.
A. Excluded "By Reason of Such Disability"
Title II of the ADA provides that "no qualified individual with a disa-
bility shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participa-
tion.' 179 The Sandison court first addressed the "by reason of such
disability" element, holding that the student athletes were not excluded
from participation by reason of their disability, but rather by reason of
their age. 8 ° The Sixth Circuit determined that the MHSAA eligibility
rule was neutral with respect to disability because it did not bar the stu-
174. See University Interscholastic League v. Buchanan, 848 S.W.2d 298, 302-03 (1993)
(holding waiver of age requirement reasonable modification); Dennin v. Connecticut Inter-
scholastic Athletic Conference, 913 F. Supp. 663 (D. Conn. 1996), vacated, appeal dis-
missed, 94 F.3d 96 (2d Cir. 1996) (holding waiver of age requirement for 19-year-old high
school student with Down's Syndrome did not fundamentally alter nature of athletic
program).
175. Ganden v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, No. 96-C6953, 1996 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 17368, at *39 (N.D. I11. Nov. 21, 1996).
176. Johnson, 899 F. Supp. at 586.
177. Id. at 584.
178. See Wright v. Columbia Univ., 520 F. Supp. 789, 793 (E.D. Pa. 1981).
179. 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (1996).
180. Sandison v. Michigan High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 64 F.3d 1026 (6th Cir. 1995), rev'g
in part, 863 F. Supp. 483 (E.D. Mich. 1994).
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dent athlete from participation due to a learning disability. 181 In fact, the
students could participate during their first three years of high school.' 82
The Johnson court, on the other hand, did not address this element in its
ADA analysis.' 83
The Sandison opinion, however, did not recognize that Stanley and
Sandison began their senior year of high school late as a direct result of a
learning disability. 184 But for the students' learning disabilities, the stu-
dent athletes would have graduated high school before turning nineteen
years of age. 185 Thus, the holding of Sandison effectively insulates orga-
nizations and programs from scrutiny by applying a narrow interpretation
of the phrase "by reason of such disability," contrary to the stated pur-
poses of the ADA. 1
86
B. Qualified Individual With a Disability: Meeting the "Essential
Eligibility Requirements"
A qualified individual is one who meets the eligibility requirements of
an organization with or without reasonable modification. 187 Under this
step in the analysis, the court must determine what the essential eligibility
requirements are, and whether the disabled individual is able to meet
181. Id. at 1032.
182. Id.
183. Johnson v. Florida High Sch. Activities Ass'n, 899 F. Supp. 579, 583 (M.D. Fla.
1995), vacated, 102 F.3d 1172 (11th Cir. 1997), appeal after remand, 103 F.3d 720 (1997).
184. Id. The court reasoned that, absent their respective learning disabilities, the stu-
dents could not satisfy the eligibility requirement. Id. In reaching this conclusion, the
court relied on case law in which the plaintiff suffered from a physical disability that pre-
vented the plaintiff from participating in a program or job. See Doherty v. Southern Coll.
of Optometry, 862 F.2d 570, 573 (6th Cir. 1988) (finding plaintiff could use optometry
instruments and meet requirements of program absent plaintiff suffering from retinitis pig-
mentos that restricted the field of vision, and an associated neurological condition that
affected plaintiff's motor skills) (emphasis added), Tuck v. HCA Health Serv. of Tennessee,
Inc., 7 F.3d 465, 473-74 (6th Cir. 1993) (holding that plaintiff could meet lifting requirement
of job absent his disability).
185. See Booth v. University Interscholastic League, No. A-90-CA-764, 1990 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 20835 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 4, 1990) (rejecting an argument similar to the one raised in
Sandison, the court noted that, "[t]o accept such an analysis would mean that any student
who fails to meet [defendant's] requirement as a result of a past handicap is not 'otherwise
qualified,' and therefore is not protected by the Rehabilitation Act.").
186. Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 295-96 (1985). Congress, from the time it im-
plemented the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, has perceived that discrimination against the
handicapped was most often not the product of invidious animus in erecting neutral barri-
ers, but rather of thoughtlessness and indifference. Id.
187. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213, § 12131(2) (1994 & Supp. 111990, Supp. III 1991, Supp.
IV 1992, Supp. V 1993).
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such requirements. In both Sandison and Johnson, the MHSAA and FH-
SAA, respectively, require student athletes to be no more than eighteen
at the start of senior year to promote safety and to create an even playing
field. 88
Neither the ADA nor its implementing regulations, however, define
what "essential eligibility requirements" are, nor do they provide gui-
dance as to what constitutes evidence of such requirements. 189 The De-
partment of Justice declined to provide a definition of "essential
eligibility requirements" because of the variety of situations in which an
individual's qualifications could be at issue.' 90 The regulations cite Nas-
sau County School Board v. Arline' 9' in support of the proposition that
the court must perform an individualized inquiry to determine whether
an athlete meets the proposed criteria.
192
In Arline, a teacher suffering from recurring tuberculosis brought a
claim stating that the school board's decision to dismiss her violated the
Rehabilitation Act.'93 The United States Supreme Court noted that an
individualized inquiry was necessary to give effect to the goals of the Re-
habilitation Act.' 94 To answer whether Arline, under the Act, was other-
wise qualified for the job of teacher, the Court found that most courts
would have to conduct an individualized inquiry and make appropriate
findings of fact.' 95 The Court determined that this inquiry was necessary
under the Rehabilitation Act to protect the disabled against deprivation
of benefits based on prejudice, stereotypes, or unfounded fear, while at
the same time balancing the legitimate concerns of the organization.'
96
The ADA's implementing regulations do provide some guidance where
questions of safety are involved. A public entity is not required to permit
an individual to participate if "that individual poses a direct threat to the
188. Sandison v. Michigan High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 64 F.3d 1026, 1035 (6th Cir. 1995);
Johnson v. Florida High Sch. Activities Ass'n, 899 F. Supp. 579, 584 (M.D. Fla. 1995),
vacated, 102 F.3d 1172 (11th Cir. 1997), appeal after remand, 103 F.3d 720 (1997).
189. Coleman & Debruge, supra note 67, at 64.
190. Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability in State and Local Government Serv-
ices, 56 Fed. Reg. 35,694, 35,700-01 (1991); but see 28 C.F.R. § 35.104 (1993). "Because of
the variety of situations in which an individual's qualifications will be at issue, it is not
possible to include more specific criteria in the definition." Id.
191. Nassau County Sch. Bd. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273 (1987).
192. See generally Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability in State and Local Gov-
ernment Services, 56 Fed. Reg. 35,694, 35,700-01 (1991) (referencing Arline).
193. Arline, 480 U.S. at 276.
194. Id. at 287.
195. Id.
196. Id.
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health or safety of others.' 19 7 The Department of Justice's comments
concerning the regulations promulgated under the ADA specifically state
that any determination of direct threat to safety may not be based on
generalizations or stereotypes, but must be based on an individualized
assessment.' 98 Additionally, the ADA prohibits the use of eligibility cri-
teria that "screen out or tend to screen out ... any class of individuals
with disabilities from fully enjoying any service, program, or activity, un-
less such criteria can be shown to be necessary for the provision of the
service, program, or activity being offered."' 9 9  Therefore, under the
ADA it is discriminatory to impose criteria that, while not creating a di-
rect bar to students with learning disabilities, indirectly prevent or limit
their ability to participate unless the organization can demonstrate that
these criteria are necessary.200 Thus, to ensure the criteria applied by an
organization do not unfairly impact upon a student athlete with a learning
disability, an individualized inquiry is not only necessary, but required
where the criteria concern safety.2
0
'
Contrary to Sandison, where the court found the eligibility require-
ment essential because the athletic organization deemed it essential, the
Johnson court analyzed the application of the age requirement to each
student.2 02 First, the court found -that the age requirement. could not be
essential to the promotion of safety and fair competition where safety and
fairness issues were not presented by the particular student athlete.20 3
Furthermore, the age requirement "tends to screen [learning disabled
students] out" of interscholastic athletics for all four years of high
197. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213, § 12182 (1994 & Supp. 111990, Supp. III 1991, Supp. IV
1992, Supp. V 1993).
198. Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability in State and Local Government Serv-
ices, 56 Fed. Reg. 35,694, 35,699 (1991). This individualized assessment must be a reason-
able judgment that relies on current medical evidence, or on the best available objective
evidence. Arline, 480 U.S. at 286.
199. 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(8) (1996).
200. Id. See Howard v. Department of Social Welfare, 655 A.2d 1102 (Vt. 1994) (hold-
ing that the limitations of Aid to Needy Families with Children provide benefits to children
under the age of eighteen, or to children expected to graduate from high school by age
nineteen, is not fundamental to the nature of the benefit program, which is to support
needy children, and that the limit discriminates against the class of learning disabled stu-
dents who have to repeat at least one year of school because of their disability); but cf.
Aughe v. Shalala, 885 F. Supp. 1428 (W.D. Wash. 1995).
201. Edwards, supra note 77, at 235-36.
202. Johnson v. Florida High Sch. Activities Ass'n, 899 F. Supp. 579, 584-85 (M.D. Fla.
1995), vacated, 102 F.3d 1172 (11th Cir. 1997), appeal after remand, 103 F.3d 720 (1997).
203. Id. at 585.
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school.2 °4 In each case, because of a learning disability, the athletes were
delayed or held back in school, thereby reaching their senior year of high
school at age nineteen. As the Johnson court points out, the ADA re-
quires a determination to be made on the basis of a specific factual situa-
tion to ensure evenhanded treatment.2 °5 Such was not done by the
Sandison court.
C. Qualified Individual With a Disability: "Reasonable Modification"
Even if a court determines that the requirement imposed is an essential
eligibility requirement, based on the legitimate reasons of the organiza-
tion, the court must nevertheless consider whether the nonqualifying dis-
abled individual may become qualified with reasonable modifications to
the program. 0 6 Thus, the issue becomes whether waiving the age re-
quirement "fundamentally alters the nature of the ... program., 20 7
Under the Rehabilitation Act, the United States Supreme Court held
that reasonable accommodations do not fundamentally or substantially
alter the nature of the program.20 8 Furthermore, the Court held that a
reasonable modification cannot impose "undue financial or administra-
tive burdens. 20 9 Following'these decisions, a number of federal agencies
promulgated regulations defining reasonable accommodation that were
later incorporated into the ADA. 10 Unfortunately, the ADA only de-
fines reasonable accommodation in the employment context, not in the
context of private and public entities.211 The lack of statutory or regula-
tory guidance forces courts to continue to define reasonable accommoda-
tion under the same standards and principles set forth in cases under the
Rehabilitation Act.21 2 Thus, in accordance with the Rehabilitation Act,
reasonable modifications are defined under the ADA on a case-by-case
basis.213
Based on the facts of both Sandison and Johnson, a waiver of the age
204. See supra notes 201-02 and accompanying text.
205. Johnson, 899 F. Supp. at 586.
206. Id.
207. 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7) (1993).
208. Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 300 (1985).
209. Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 412 (1979).
210. Wenkart, supra note 55, at 296.
211. See ADA, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327, codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213,
§ 12211(9) (1994 & Supp. 11 1990, Supp. III 1991, Supp. IV 1992, Supp. V 1993).
212. Wenkart, supra note 55, at 300.
213. Dawn V. Martin, Symposium: The Americans With Disabilities Act-Introductory
Comments, 8 J.L. & HEALTH 1, 7 (1993-94) (for example, an accommodation which consti-
tutes undue hardship for one, may be easily accomplished by another).
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requirement by the athletic association is a reasonable modification that
neither fundamentally alters the stated purposes of the age requirement,
nor imposes undue financial or administrative burdens. First, as to the
safety purpose, the court in Johnson found that if a qualified student ath-
lete with a learning disability does not himself threaten the safety of the
other players because of size or weight, then the safety purpose advanced
by the age requirement is not weakened. 14 Furthermore, as the court
asserted in Johnson, "strength and size disparities already exist through-
out the leagues and yet no comparative analysis is undertaken., 215 By
imposing an age requirement, the athletic associations make the assump-
tion that the height and weight of an eighteen versus nineteen-year-old
adolescent vary. In fact, the average girl's growth spurt peaks at eleven
and one-half years, and then slows to a stop at sixteen years.2 16 The aver-
age boy's growth spurt peaks at thirteen and one-half years, and then
slows to a stop at eighteen years.217 Weight gain parallels linear growth,
with a delay of several months, so that adolescents seem first to stretch
and then to fill out.21
8
Second, as to the fairness in competition purpose, the concern about an
unfair competitive advantage over other players is not present where stu-
dent athletes have only competed for three years at the high school level.
No student athlete on the playing field has participated more than three
years unless a waiver previously has been made under the athletic regula-
tions.2 19 Therefore, the athlete has not gained an extra year of talking to
the coach about strategy and ability, or experienced more playing time.2
Although the Sandison court determined that modifications which
would provide an individualized assessment of student athletes would im-
pose undue financial and administrative burdens,2 these burdens do not
214. Johnson v. Florida High Sch. Activities Ass'n, 899 F. Supp. 579, 585 (M.D. Fla.
1995), vacated, 102 F.3d 1172 (11th Cir. 1997), appeal after remand, 103 F.3d 720 (1997).
215. Id. at 586 (asserting that this argument of the FHSAA makes a "mountain out of a
molehill").
216. NELSON TEXTBOOK OF PEDIATRICS 62 (Richard E. Behrman et al., eds., 15th ed.
1996).
217. Id.
218. Id. (Muscle mass also increases during adolescence, followed several months later
by an increase in strength; boys show greater gains in both.) Id.
219. See, e.g., Dennin v. Connecticut Interscholastic Athletic Conference, 913 F. Supp.
663, 669 (D. Conn. 1996), vacated, 94 F.3d 96 (2d. Cir. 1996) (the mechanism for granting
transfer waivers is already in place through athletic associations).
220. Looney, supra note 163, at 20.
221. Sandison v. Michigan High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 64 F.3d 1026, 1035 (6th Cir. 1995),
rev'g in part, 863 F. Supp. 483 (E.D. Mich. 1994).
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outweigh the interest of providing the individual disabled athlete the op-
portunity to participate in the athletic program. The court in Sandison
asserted high school coaches and hired physicians would have to weigh
five criteria to assess the unfair competitive advantage of each individual
player: the athlete's chronological age, physical maturity, athletic experi-
ence, athletic skill level, and mental ability to process sports strategy. 22
However, high school coaches, with almost daily contact with their ath-
letes, may be biased in their assessment because of personal involvement
with each student athlete and the desire to see the athlete succeed. Alter-
natively, a family physician could more fairly determine physical maturity
and mental ability to assess sports strategy at the yearly physical required
by most athletic associations the summer prior to the school year. 23 In
addition, athletic organizations, such as the MHSAA and FHSAA, al-
ready have a reviewing body that meets to consider waivers of other eligi-
bility criteria. 224 Thus, an individualized assessment of the athletes would
not impose an undue burden on the athletic association.
Balancing the benefits to learning disabled students of athletic compe-
tition and team participation against the interests advanced by athletic
associations weighs in favor of a waiver of the age requirement as a rea-
sonable modification to eligibility.225 The Sandison opinion overlooked
the purpose of the ADA by stating that a waiver of the age requirement
was not a reasonable accommodation because the students' learning disa-
bilities were not "overcome," such that the students were no longer pre-
vented from participating in high school athletics.2 26 As the Supreme
Court notes, a reasonable accommodation seeks to "assure evenhanded
treatment and the opportunity for handicapped individuals to participate
in and benefit from the program., 22 7 After an individualized determina-
tion, removing the age requirement for learning disabled athletes would
give the learning disabled student the equal opportunity to participate in
high school athletics for four years, or eight consecutive semesters. Thus,
222. Id.
223. Id. See MHSAA HANDBOOK 1996-97, supra note 125, Reg. I, § 3, at 28; Hand-
book of the FHSAA, supra note 158, § 19.15.1, at 39-40.
224. MHSAA HANDBOOK 1996-97, supra note 125, Art. VII, § 4.E., at 19; Handbook of
the FHSAA, supra note 158, § 20.1.1, at 40.
225. Learning disabled students gain friends, confidence, and become more social by
participating in interscholastic athletics. Johnson v. Florida High Sch. Activities Ass'n, 899
F. Supp. 579, 586 (M.D. Fla. 1995), vacated, 102 F.3d 1172 (11th Cir. 1997), appeal after
remand, 103 F.3d 720 (1997).
226. Sandison, 64 F.3d at 1027-28.
227. Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 410 (1979).
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as the Johnson court held, a waiver of the age requirement in such cases
would not fundamentally alter the safe and fair nature of interscholastic
athletics and would at most place an incidental burden on associations.228
V. NCAA REGULATIONS IN VIOLATION OF THE ADA?
Learning disabled students who challenge their denial from participat-
ing in high school athletics face the same battle in qualifying for participa-
tion in collegiate athletics. In a case of first impression, a high school
student is challenging the NCAA for violating the ADA."2 9 Chad
Ganden, a state champion in the 100-yard freestyle, filed suit against the
NCAA in the United States District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois because the NCAA denied him the privilege of being able to par-
ticipate on, and benefit from, NCAA-sanctioned athletic competition.23 °
The lawsuit is premised on the fact that Ganden took special courses for
the learning disabled during high school that the NCAA refused to accept
because they did not meet NCAA academic guidelines for eligibility.23'
Ganden asked the judge to "order that the NCAA ... be permanently
enjoined from preventing Ganden from participating athletically in inter-
collegiate events during his freshman year., 2 32
Ganden was diagnosed with a learning disability in sixth grade. 33 He
has a decoding problem that makes it difficult to translate letters into
spoken words, thus affecting Ganden's ability to read.234 As a result of
his learning disability, Ganden took some fundamental, or basic, courses
during his freshman and sophomore years of high school before transfer-
ring into regular courses.235
228. Johnson, 899 F. Supp. at 586.
229. Ganden v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, No. 96-C6953, 1996 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 17368, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 21, 1996); see Tamar Lewin, Furiously Treading Water,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1, 1995, at B22.
230. Ganden, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17368, at *1; see David Nakamura, Swimmer Seeks
An Injunction Against NCAA, WASH. POST, Oct. 25, 1996, at C2.
231. Ganden, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17368, at *1. The NCAA's eligibility require-
ments, effective fall of 1996, require for Division I competition: (1) a minimum of 13 high
school "core courses"; and, (2) attainment of a GPA in those core courses determined by a
sliding scale based upon student's standard college entrance exam scores. Id. at *4-5.
232. Id. at *1.
233. David Nakamura, Full Waiver Denied for Swimmer, WASH. PosT, Oct. 11, 1996, at
C4.
234. Id.
235. Id.
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A. NCAA Eligibility Requirements
According to NCAA Division I eligibility requirements, 236 to receive a
scholarship and compete in a Division I college sport, a student must
meet a minimum score on the American College Test ("ACT") 237 or
Scholastic Assessment Test ("SAT") 23 8 and a minimum grade point aver-
age ("GPA") in thirteen college prepatory courses.239 A "partial quali-
fier" is deemed eligible to practice with a team and to receive an athletic
scholarship during his first year at a Division I school.24 0 A "partial qual-
ifier" does not have to meet the requirements for a qualifier, but is re-
quired to present an acceptable GPA and SAT or ACT scores based on a
separate partial qualifier index scale.241
The NCAA defines a "core course" as a "recognized academic course
that offers fundamental instruction in a specific area of study., 24 2 For
high school courses for the learning disabled or handicapped to count
toward the core course requirement, the principal of the high school must
submit a written letter to the NCAA. The letter must state that "students
236. THE NCAA 7-8 (1996). To curb abuses in intercollegiate football, President Theo-
dore Roosevelt summoned college athletics leaders to the White House to encourage re-
forms. The Intercollegiate Athletic Association of the United States ("IAAUS") was
founded by 62 members on December 28, 1905. The IAAUS was officially constituted
March 31, 1906, and took its present name (NCAA) in 1910. For several years, the NCAA
was-a discussion group, but in 1921 the first championship was held and gradually more
rules committees were formed. A national headquarters was founded in 1952 to deal with
the complexity of problems the NCAA faced. In 1973, the NCAA's membership was di-
vided into three competitive divisions. Id.
237. The American College Test stresses mastery of the high school curriculum, as op-
posed to the Scholastic Assessment Test ("SAT") which is a predictor of a student's ability
to do college work. A Rejection Slip for the SAT, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 27, 1987, at 71.
238. Nicholas Lemann, The Structure of Success in America; Educational Testing, Col-
lege Admissions, and the Social Elite, 276 ATLANnC MONTHLY 41, 48 (1995). Carl Brig-
ham developed his own objective admissions test for students applying to Princeton in the
early 1920s. The college board then placed him in charge of a committee to develop a test
that could be used for a wider group of schools. This test was called the SAT. Despite the
test's name, the creators were not thinking in terms of aptitude, but educational prepared-
ness. Id.
239. STEPHEN A. MALLONEE, 1996-97 NCAA GUIDE FOR THE COLLEGE-BOUND STU-
DENT-ATHLETE 2 (Michael V. Earle ed., 1996). This core curriculum consists of at least
four years of English; two years of mathematics (algebra, geometry, or a high-level math
course for which geometry is a prerequisite); two years of social sciences; two years of
natural or physical science, including one laboratory class if offered by the high school; one
additional class in English, math, or natural or physical science; and two additional aca-
demic courses. Id.
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. Id.
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in such courses are expected to acquire the same knowledge as students
in other core courses and that the same grading standards are
employed. 243
B. NCAA Eligibility Requirements Adverse to Learning Disabilities
The NCAA's Initial Eligibility Clearinghouse 244 declared Ganden inel-
igible both to receive an athletic scholarship as a freshman and to com-
pete during his four seasons of eligibility.2 45 Michigan State University
appealed, on behalf of Ganden, the Clearinghouse's ruling to the
NCAA's Academic Requirements Committee.246 The Committee
granted Ganden a partial waiver, allowing Ganden to practice with Mich-
igan State and to accept a scholarship. 247 Ganden could not, however,
compete with the swim team in NCAA-sanctioned meets until the follow-
ing academic year. 48 In addition, Ganden would lose one season of eligi-
bility.249 Michigan State appealed the partial waiver decision to the
NCAA Council, the NCAA's highest decision-making body, which de-
nied Ganden's appeal.250
Ganden's waiver was the first waiver granted by the NCAA to a stu-
dent athlete with a learning disability.251' Ganden met the GPA and stan-
dardized test requirements, but did not meet the core course
requirements. In Ganden's junior year, 3.5 core course credits completed
during his freshman and sophomore years of high school were deemed
unacceptable by the NCAA.252 Thus, Ganden fell below the thirteen
core course credit requirement.
Initially, the United States District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois determined that it had subject matter jurisdiction over the NCAA
243. Id. at 3.
244. The Clearinghouse was established by the NCAA so that a uniform determination
could be made of which high school classes satisfied the "core course" requirement.
Ganden v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, No. 96-C6953, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17368,
at *5 n.2 (N.D. I11. Nov. 21, 1960).
245. Id. at *6; see Nakamura, supra note 233, at C4.
246. Ganden, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17368, at *8.
247. Id. at *12.
248. Id. at *4.
249. Id.
250. Id. at *12.
251. Tarik EI-Bashir, Learning Disabled Man Gains N.C.A.A. Victory, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 14, 1996, at B17.
252. Id. The NCAA's bylaws concerning "core courses" specifically exclude courses
taught below the regular academic instruction level. Ganden, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
17368, at *5.
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under Title III of the ADA.253 Next, the court found that Ganden could
establish a "causal link" between his learning disability and the NCAA's
denial of his waiver application, and, therefore, was a "qualifier." '254 The
court rejected the NCAA's argument, which relied on Sandison, for the
proposition that Ganden's learning disability did not prevent him from
meeting the "core course" requirement.255 Next, the NCAA argued that
Ganden's combined GPA and ACT scores fell below the established re-
quirements.256 The Ganden court found evidence that Ganden failed to
take the core courses because of his learning disability, which required
him to take special education classes.257 Thus, Ganden would likely be
able to establish a causal link between his learning disability and the
NCAA's failure to grant a waiver.
Next, the court addressed whether the NCAA could make any reason-
able modifications to accommodate Ganden.25 s First, the court identified
the minimum GPA requirement and the defined "core course" require-
ments as the necessary eligibility requirements. 259 Then, the court identi-
fied that the purpose of these eligibility requirements is to "(1) insure
that student-athletes are representative of the college community and not
recruited solely for athletics; (2) insure that a student-athlete is academi-
cally prepared to succeed at college; and (3) preserve amateurism in in-
tercollegiate sports. '260 The court initially concluded that a waiver would
not "fundamentally alter" the nature of the intercollegiate athletic pro-
gram.26' The court distinguished the case before it from Sandison and
Pottgen, where both the Sixth and Eighth Circuits concluded that a waiver
of the age requirement in interscholastic high school athletic programs
would pose an undue burden on the athletic associations to assess, indi-
vidually, each student's competitive abilities.262 The Ganden court rea-
253. Ganden, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17368, at *21-34.
254. Id. at *39.
255. Id. at *40 (citing Sandison v. Michigan High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 64 F.3d 1026, 1033
(6th Cir. 1995)).
256. Id. at *39.
257. Id. at *40 (relying on Dennin v. Connecticut Interscholastic Athletic Conference,
Inc., 913 F. Supp. 663, 669 (D. Conn. 1996)).
258. Id. at *41. Title III analysis parallels Title II "otherwise qualified" analysis under
the ADA, asking whether the essential eligibility requirements were met and, if not,
whether any reasonable modifications exist. Johnson v. Florida High Sch. Activities Ass'n,
899 F. Supp. 579, 583 n.5 (M.D. Fla. 1995).
259. Ganden, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17368, at *43.
260. Id.
261. Id. at *44.
262. Id.
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soned that the NCAA already has the Initial Eligibility Clearinghouse in
place providing individual assessments of each student athlete
applicant.263
The Ganden court followed the Johnson district court decision by as-
sessing each applicant's case. The court refused to accept the analysis
advanced by Sandison and Pottgen that questioned whether the eligibility
requirements served an important interest of the program.264 The
Ganden court criticized this analysis for ignoring the central issue under
the ADA: "[whether] reasonable accommodations [are] possible in light
of the disability.,2 65 The court concluded that the correct analysis was to
address the underlying purposes of the eligibility criteria to determine
whether a modification of the stated purposes would be undermined in
the individual plaintiff's circumstances.266 The court found, however, that
the underlying purpose of the NCAA eligibility requirements would be
undermined in Ganden's individual circumstance.
The court in Ganden determined that Ganden's request for a waiver to
be certified a "qualifier" would fundamentally alter the particular accom-
modation provided by the NCAA.2 67 The court found that the NCAA
accommodated Ganden by providing him an individualized assessment
through a subcommittee that considered Ganden's disability, his efforts
to overcome it, and his academic success during his final two years of high
school.2 68 In Ganden's case, the court determined that the evidence in
the record before it demonstrated that the remedial courses taken by
Ganden were not "remotely similar" to the NCAA's "core course" re-
quirement.2 69 Furthermore, the' court contended that it would be unrea-
sonable to require the NCAA to lower the GPA requirement because it
would undermine the NCAA's objective to assess a student's academic
potential.2 70 According to the court, it was less drastic to modify the core
263. Id.
264. Id. at *45.
265. Id. (relying on Johnson, 899 F. Supp. at 584).
266. Id. at *45.
267. Id. at *46.
268. Id. at *49.
269. Id. at *47. The NCAA's "core course" requirements serve as an indicator of a
student's academic capabilities. Id.
270. ld. at *48. See Edwards, supra note 77, at 230. The Supreme Court has identified
the four essential freedoms of a university as: "determining for itself on academic grounds
who may teach, what may be taught, how it shall be taught, and who may be permitted to
study." Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957). Although the legislature has in-
creased the involvement of courts, deference is given with respect to "an applicant's quali-
fications and whether he or she would meet reasonable standards for academic and
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course requirement.27'
Thus, the court concluded that the NCAA, after an individualized as-
sessment, had made a reasonable modification for Ganden's particular
circumstances by granting him "partial qualifier" status.272 Therefore,
the court denied Ganden's request for a preliminary injunction because
his claim under the ADA would likely fail due to his inability to prove
discrimination under Title 111.273
VI. PRACTITIONERS' GUIDE TO BRINGING A CLAIM ON BEHALF OF A
LEARNING DISABLED STUDENT ATHLETE UNDER THE ADA
As noted above, to establish a prima facie case of disability discrimina-
tion under the ADA, a plaintiff must show that he was denied participa-
tion because of his disability.274 The burden then shifts to the entity
charged with discrimination, which must show that the eligibility require-
ments are essential to the program and that the plaintiff cannot meet
these requirements despite reasonable modifications.275 Thus, when a
student athlete has been denied participation on either an interscholastic
or intercollegiate athletic team, the first step in bringing a viable claim
under the ADA is to establish that the discrimination is "by reason of
[the learning] disability.,2 76
The Sandison and Pottgen decisions held that the appropriate test
under this part of the prima facie case was whether absent the disability
the student athlete could meet the established eligibility requirements.
2 77
In those cases, the courts found that absent the student athletes' respec-
tive learning disabilities, the students could not meet the age requirement
for participation in interscholastic high school athletics because of their
birth dates.278 In Ganden, however, the Illinois District Court adopted
the "causal link" test used by the court in Dennin v. Connecticut Inter-
professional achievement established by a university or a non-legal profession." See Doe
v. New York Univ., 666 F.2d 771, 775-76 (2d Cir. 1981) (citing University of Missouri v.
Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78, 92 (1978) ("[C]ourts are particularly ill-equipped to evaluate aca-
demic performance.").
271. Ganden, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17368, at *49.
272. Id.
273. Id. at *51-52.
274. See supra notes 92-99 and accompanying text.
275. See supra notes 100-15 and accompanying text.
276. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213, § 12132, §§ 12301-12310 (1994 & Supp. 11 1990, Supp.
III 1991, Supp. IV 1992, Supp. V 1993); see supra notes 181-88 and accompanying text.
277. Sandison v. Michigan High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 64 F.3d 1026, 1036-37 (6th Cir.
1995), rev'g in part, 863 F. Supp. 483 (E.D. Mich. 1995).
278. Id.
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scholastic Athletic Conference, Inc.2 79 Under the "causal link test," the
student athlete must demonstrate that, but for his diagnosed learning dis-
ability, he could not meet the established eligibility requirements.
2 80
The next step in establishing a prima facie case of disability discrimina-
tion under the ADA is to determine what the essential eligibility require-
ments of the program are, and the underlying purpose for such
requirements.2 8 ' Both the Department of Justice regulations and the
Supreme Court's holding in Arline state that an individual inquiry is nec-
essary at this point to determine if the individual meets the established
requirements. 82 If the court determines that these eligibility require-
ments are in fact essential to the program, the challenged entity must
show why modifications to these requirements would not be reason-
able.2 83 Reasonableness is determined by asking whether the proposed
modification would substantially or fundamentally alter the nature of the
program or impose undue financial burdens.2 84
To determine whether a modification to existing eligibility require-
ments is reasonable, the Sixth and Eighth Circuit courts look to see
whether the eligibility requirements serve any important interests of the
program.2 85  However, the district courts in Johnson, Dennin, and
Ganden, applied a balancing test that weighed the interests of the student
athlete against the interests of the association.281 The individualized as-
sessment effectuates the purpose of the ADA because, as the court stated
in Ganden, a "modification of a rule rationally tailored to the denied priv-
279. Ganden v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, No. 96-C6953, 1996 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 17368, at *39-40 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 21, 1996). See Rhodes v. Ohio High Sch. Athletic
Ass'n, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12998, at *24 (N.D. Ohio 1996) (suggesting "causal connec-
tion" test).
280. Id.
281. Id.; Johnson v. Florida High Sch. Activities Ass'n, 899 F. Supp. 579, 584 (M.D. Fla.
1995), vacated, 102 F.3d 1172 (11th Cir. 1997), appeal after remand, 103 F.3d 720 (1997).
282. See supra notes 189-203 and accompanying text.
283. See supra notes 206-07 and accompanying text.
284. See supra notes 208-13 and accompanying text.
285. Sandison v. Michigan High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 64 F.3d 1026, 1037 (6th Cir. 1995),
rev'g in part, 863 F. Supp. 483 (E.D. Mich. 1994); Pottgen v. Missouri State High Sch.
Activities Ass'n, 40 F.3d 926, 930-31 (8th Cir. 1994), rev'g, 857 F. Supp. 654 (E.D. Mo.
1994).
286. Johnson v. Florida High Sch. Activities Ass'n, 899 F. Supp. 579, 585 (M.D. Fla.
1995), vacated, 102 F.3d 1172 (11th Cir. 1997), appeal after remand, 103 F.3d 720 (1997);
Dennin v. Connecticut Interscholastic Athletic Conference, Inc., 913 F. Supp. 663, appeal
dismissed, 94 F.3d 96; Ganden v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, No. 96-C6953, 1996
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17368, at *45 (N.D. I11. Nov. 21, 1996).
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ilege would [always] be unreasonable. 287 Thus, to eliminate discrimina-
tion against individuals,288 which is often the product of "thoughtlessness
and indifference-of benign neglect," not invidious acts of discrimina-
tion,2 8 9 an individual assessment is necessary.
VII. CONCLUSION
The Johnson district court decision, though a well-reasoned and logical
analysis under the ADA, illustrates the confusion and uneven applica-
tion of the ADA to learning disabled athletes who want to participate in
interscholastic athletics. Furthermore, recent claims, similar to Chad
Ganden's against the NCAA, demonstrate that interpretation issues
under the ADA must be resolved to provide for just and uniform results.
Without additional guidance from the Department of Justice, the vague
terms encompassed in the statutory language of the ADA will continue to
be interpreted differently by individual courts, thus obviating the purpose
of the ADA: to protect the disabled from unintentional and indifferent
means of discrimination.
This ambiguity invites the courts to assume a more active role in re-
viewing the ADA and its implementing regulations. However, the judici-
ary's function is not to sit as a super-legislature and to determine what the
terms "reasonable modification" and "by reason of such disability" actu-
ally mean. Rather, the judiciary should take a closer look at the regula-
tions and case law under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act to ensure
that it is logically interpreting these important pieces of civil rights legisla-
tion for the disabled. Moreover, the conflicting interpretations may indi-
cate that the United States Supreme Court needs to provide clarification
on the statutory language. The effects of these lower court decisions will
be long felt by the individual student athletes who are denied participa-
tion, and will serve as blatant reminders that their learning disability was
the cause of this denial.
287. Ganden, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17368, at *45.
288. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213.
289. Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 295 n.12 (1985).
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